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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The Committee [House of Representatives Defense Subcommittee] and
Congress truly believe that during a period ofdecreasing defense budgets,
it makes sense to put more, not less, force structure into the reserve
components. Manpower requirements to support operation Desert Shield
could not have been accomplished without the reserve components.
Unless the United States decides to reinstate the draft, it is more
important than ever that a highly trained, readily available National
Guard and Reserve force be maintained. [Ref. 1]
With these strong words directed at Secretary of Defense Richard B.
Cheney in a recent personal letter, Representative John P. Murtha reiterated
Congress' renewed and increased interest in the role of our Reserve and
National Guard units in the Total Force approach to meeting future force
structure requirements. This interest was triggered by steadily rising defense
budgets, declining resources and unpredictable changes in the threats to our
national security.
"Since its adoption in 1973, the Total Force Policy has provided the DoD
with an integrated force of active, reserve, retired military, federal, civilian,
and contractor personnel [Ref. 2:p. 2]." The major objective of the Total
Force Policy has been to maintain as small an active peacetime force as
national security policy, military strategy, and overseas commitments permit,
and to integrate the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve
components in a cost-effective manner. The Total Force concept was reaffirmed
by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1982 when he said, "We can no
longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in reserve ... instead, they have
to be an integral part of the total force. Only in that way can we achieve the
military strength that is necessary to defend our freedom [Ref. 3:pp. 7-
8]."
In 1983, faced with an increasingly stringent defense budget, Congress
directed that each service provide for greater Reserve participation in the
active duty mission. A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
was created to foster this move, and reserve forces were subsequently assigned
to more demanding wartime missions and to fill additional critical peacetime
operational responsibilities. To date, efforts to integrate Reserve forces into
many of the missions traditionally performed by active-duty personnel - the
most costly manpower asset - have proven very successful. Of particular note,
the Navy has placed a significant percentage of its antisubmarine warfighting
capability in the Naval Reserve. Currently 35% of all maritime patrol (VP)
squadrons are run exclusively by the Reserves who augment their active-duty
counterparts in the continental United States (CONUS), and various deployed
sites in the Atlantic and Pacific.
While the ability to expand the scope of the U.S. Navy through the use
of Reserve forces remains an important strategy in maintaining a formidable
military posture across the oceans, a new Reserve initiative has rapidly gained
significance.
In light of the dramatic geopolitical changes that have taken place in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East during the past year, the need for large
U.S. forces that can fight on short notice has apparently diminished. Retaining
forces in the reserve components rather than on active-duty has become an
attractive option to Congress because of the widely perceived notion that
reserve force units have considerably lower operating costs than comparable
active units. In a speech before Congress on April 20, 1990, Senator Sam Nunn
talked of a new military strategy that called for the greater utilization of the
Reserves as a cost saving step. In terms of Navy aviation, he specifically
conveyed that:
....Currently a third of the P-3 fleet is operated by reserve units. By most
accounts, they perform the ASW mission very well, even though they are
given the oldest and least capable aircraft. Transferring modern P-3's to
Navy Reserve P-3 squadrons and deactivating some active squadrons
could save between $1.5 and $1.8 billion over five years. [Ref. 4]
On October 26, 1990, under the political dark clouds of runaway spending, a
record budget deficit exceeding $360 billion and a weakened economy, the
conferees of the FY-91 National Defense Authorization Act made the following
unprecedented commitment to the nation's Reserve and National Guard forces
in light of the fiscal constraints we face:
A total of$1.9 billion is authorized for new equipment for National Guard
and Reserve Forces, $1.4 billion above the amount requested in the
budget. The conferees maintained the force structure and personnel
strength of the Reserve components at the current levels for fiscal year
1991, rather than making the reductions called for in the budget request.
The conferees directed increased Reserve participation in several mission
areas, including antisubmarine warfare and tactical airlift. Finally the
conferees instituted a program to integrate more active duty personnel
into the day-to-day training and management of Reserve component
forces beginning in fiscal year 1992. [Ref. 5]
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In the past, it was generally assumed that transferring forces and
missions to the Reserves would always result in substantial savings due to
lower personnel and operating costs. However, experience has shown that the
precise magnitude of the cost differential will vary according to the manning
level, mission, and operating tempo of the units in question. For example,
while the maritime patrol mission of the P-3 Active and Reserve forces remain
nearly the same, the part time status ofReserve personnel cannot allow for the
same level of output. A few cost studies were conducted in the mid-1980s to
verify the extent of these cost reductions. A 1985 RAND study indicated that
maintaining a carrier air wing in the Reserve costs about 54% of the cost of an
active air wing - a 46% savings. Conversely, maintaining a reserve frigate costs
approximately 86% of the cost of maintaining an active frigate - a 14% savings
[Ref. 6]. Unfortunately, past studies of active and reserve force units
suffered from unsuitable or incomplete data deficiencies which resulted in a
degradation of critical cost factors needed in making force mix decisions.
The idea of identifying, for cost comparison, Active and Reserve VP units
with nearly identical missions appeared reasonable and timely in view of
recent mandates to downscale the VP community. In developing the cost
comparison, several qualifying assumptions were required. First, there could
be no degradation in quality of work performed between the VP Reserve and
Active forces. While some controversy exists over this issue of combat
readiness, recent classified readiness data indicates that the readiness ofNaval
Air Reserve squadrons is on par with that of fleet squadrons [Ref. 3:p. 11]. The
second assumption is that both forces are similarly manned, equipped, and
have similar wartime missions. In most of the cases examined, active and
reserve units were manned at, or near, full authorization levels. All units were
found to be operating with eight P-3 aircraft, and although the active forces
utilize predominantly P-3C models against the reserve P-3B models, we
consider this difference negligible. In terms of wartime missions it was
determined that the reserve units may not have quite the full range of
operational capabilities as their active counterparts (such as HARPOON).
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However, we dismissed this on the grounds that the majority of reserve
personnel are prior-service, and have received extensive active duty training
in the few types of missions lacking in the reserve units. Finally we have
expressed all costs in FY-1990 dollars. Other than actual FY-1990 data was
converted to the FY-1990 base using published service-generated indexes.
Given these conditions, the primary research questions are:
1. How would a Navy analyst or planner define the annual
recurring operating and support costs of active and reserve force
P-3 aviation units? Where would he or she go to obtain historical
and present cost data?
2. What cost methodology would best provide Navy analysts with
a framework for estimating P-3 annual unit costs?
3. What are the primary recurring cost factors that drive the
annual costs of active and reserve force units and contribute to
resulting cost differentials?
4. Do reserve force P-3 squadrons have considerably lower annual
recurring costs than comparably equipped active squadrons? If
so, what reserve costs typically realize a savings advantage over
the active units?
5. Given the recent Navy and DoD proposals to downscale the VP
active/reserve mix from the current status of 24 active/13
reserve squadrons to either (1) 18 active/9 reserve or (2) 13
active/13 reserve squadrons, which alternative would be the
most economically efficient?
6. Will a cost comparison alone suffice as a basis for adequately
addressing the total cost implication of large force mix changes
such as those being currently proposed by the Navy and DoD?
If not, what are some of the additional non-recurring costs
associated with unit changes that must be included to provide
a complete cost analysis suitable for force mix decisions?
Answers to these research questions will be clearly discernible to the reader
in the ensuing Chapters II through V.
C. APPROACH
The methodology for this cost analysis will begin with an existing cost
model developed by the RAND Corporation which used active/reserve F-4
squadrons as its base. The model will be modified to adequately assess
active/reserve VP costs with suitable and consistent inputs obtained from
official published service documents and professional organizations in most
cases. The model will present a framework for estimating annual unit costs,
and any cost differences that show significant variation will be analyzed and
discussed. The model will combine operating and support costs in a series of
simple linear equations. Appropriate discounting techniques will be employed
to determine the multiyear cost savings for each ofthe proposed Navy and DoD
force mix alternatives. This cost comparison will not attempt to validate the
RAND Corporation's costing approach, but it will provide evidence to support
and contribute to future VP active/reserve policymaking decisions.
The remainder of this thesis will examine Reserve force integration and
current maritime patrol (VP) structure (Chapter II), VP Active/Reserve cost
estimates and cost comparisons based on current and proposed force mix
alternatives (Chapters III and IV), and will conclude with a discussion of the
findings and recommendations of the cost analysis (Chapter V). An appendix
at the end of the thesis provides a glossary of commonly used Naval Reserve
terms to assist the reader in the understanding of the Reserve force structure.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. NAVAL RESERVE
The Naval Reserve was established on March 3, 1915. From World War
I to the present the Naval Reserve has played a key role in both peacetime and
periods ofdomestic and international conflict. "In World War II, approximately
75 percent of the Officers and Enlisted men who served on active duty with the
Navy were Reservists [Ref. 2:p. 14]." Since 1953, U.S. Naval Reserve forces
have been called to active duty for international crises on several occasions,
including the current call-up for Operation Desert Shield. Today, the Naval
Reserve has grown to more than 773,000 men and women.
The Reserve Force structure can be broken into two separate groups. The
largest of these is the Ready Reserve, while the second group consists of those
personnel who are Retired or Standby Reservists. The Ready Reserve is
composed of the two most combat-ready elements - the Active Duty Reservists
and Inactive Duty Reservists. Active Duty Reservists are those career-oriented
TAR (Training and Administration of Reserves) military personnel whose
specialty is the administration and training of drilling Reservists. TARs are
full-time officers and enlisted personnel who run the Reserve program on a
daily basis. The Inactive duty segment of the Ready Reserves is comprised of
two key groups: drilling Selected Reserves (SELRES) personnel, and those in
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). [Ref. 3:p. 3]
From the TAR and Selected Reserve categories come the personnel who
comprise the personnel cost factors for the Reserve half of the cost analysis.
Selected Reserve personnel are the heart and soul of the entire Naval Reserve
program. These "citizen sailors" are the often called "weekend warriors" who
are required to perform four drills (four hour work periods) per month and at
least two weeks (12 days) of Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) per year.
"Most of the all volunteer SELRES personnel are Navy Veterans who continue
their affiliation with the Navy while, at the same time, pursuing their civilian
careers." [Ref. 3:p. 4]
Many reservists like to perform "additional drills" beyond the minimum
prescribed. These drills, in addition to the required four per month, are
authorized for those individuals who desire or require more time to maintain
proficiency in high skill areas. Reserve pilots, for example, often perform up to
48 additional drills per year. Special Active Duty, which is active duty
performed in excess of the two week annual requirement, is often used by
these same reservists who wish to enhance specialty skills or assist the TARs
in the administration of squadron operations.
During the weekday periods when the SELRES are active in their civilian
careers, TAR personnel keep the programs and equipment operating. They are
analogous to a highly trained pit crew who provide daily continuity and expert
skills to the Reserve program vehicle. They are the administrators and
custodians of the Naval Reserve Community.
Important to note is the projected growth of these two groups: SELRES
personnel strengths are planned to remain at an end-strength ofapproximately
130,692 through FY-92. TAR personnel (the most costly Ready Reserve
personnel) are programmed to grow from 22,708 in FY-90 to 23,000 plus in FY-
92. This planned expansion of TARs coincides with the increasing pressure
from Congress to integrate more active duty personnel into the day-to-day
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operations of reserve units, and therefore to be able to transfer more missions
to the Reserve Forces. [Ref. 5]
B. RESERVE FORCE INTEGRATION
The Conference Report on the FY-84 Defense Authorization Bill asked the
Services to provide the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives with an annual report outlining changes that
will be accomplished to provide the Guard and the Reserves with: new
missions, more modern equipment, and greater integration with the
active forces. [Ref. 7]
In this statement, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman referred
to Congress' increased interest in reducing defense spending through greater
use of the "perceived" less costly Reserve Armed Forces. Although initially
skeptical that transferring missions to the Reserves in all cases would actually
save money, Lehman still committed the Navy to a growth and modernization
of the Naval Reserve Forces. "Since 1980, Selected Reserves end-strength has
grown by over 50 percent. By comparison, during the same period, Active Duty
end-strength increased 15 percent. On the modernization side, consistent with
its policy ofhorizontal integration, the Navy has placed front-line weaponry in
the Naval Reserve, including the F/A-18, modern frigates, P-3C Update Ill's,
and HH-60H helicopters." [Ref. 3:p. 4]
In the last ten years, the Navy has also placed a significant percentage
of its warfighting capability in the Naval Reserves. With increased warning
times due to the declining Soviet threat, there will no doubt be greater future
emphasis on shifting more forces and missions from the active to the reserve
components. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr.
Stephen Duncan, recently summed it up well when he testified before
Congress:
I believe that for cost reasons alone, a rebuttable presumption should
exist that missions should be considered for assignment to the Reserve
forces unless there are sound and apparent military reasons for assigning
the mission to the Active forces. If the presumption can't be easily
rebutted, then a particular mission would seem to be a prime candidate
for assignment to the Reserve forces. [Ref. 4]
It is through this integration of the active and reserve components that
the Navy receives its peacetime dividend on the investment made in
manpower, training and modern equipment for the Naval Reserve. With the
prospects of declining resources in the near future, it would appear logical that
continued integration could yield significant cost saving dividends.
Two important issues must be considered, however, ifCongress wishes to
depend more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces now and into the future.
These two issues are "availability" and "accessibility." Concern has been
rightfully expressed that, although initial cost studies show a substantial
savings when Reserve forces assume an active duty mission, further analysis
has shown that the degree of participation by the Reserves will affect mission
effectiveness and the amount of savings. Selected Reservists are an "all
volunteer" force in the truest sense and there are definite bounds - civilian job
and family related - on the time they can devote to their Navy duties. There
would appear, therefore, to be some "practical limits" under the Total Force
Concept, on the number of forces and missions which can be shifted from the
active to the reserve component and still maintain an effective and balanced
force structure.
The issue of accessibility of reserve personnel during peacetime remains
an unresolved topic of debate and has been discussed in earlier Total Force
Reports. Accessibility means the availability of reserve personnel to conduct
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operational missions in times of emergency. Under current law, the President
has the authority to mobilize up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve
for operational necessity for as long as 180 days (two 90-day periods).
Presidents had been typically reluctant to use this authority until recently.
President Bush, in a move to test the Total Force Policy and reassure military
planners that reserve units are ready when needed, exercised the mobilization
system by calling up 134,000 members of the Selected Reserve to participate
in Operation Desert Shield [Ref. 2:p. 71]. Although this complex operation
appears to have been one ofthe largest and most successful deployments in our
nation's history, there remains some uncertainty associated with having to rely
on volunteers to respond to contingencies.
Because this issue ofaccessibility remains in question, Navy planners and
decision makers must consider the level of risk inherent in large force mix
decisions resulting in all, or nearly all, of a specific capability being assigned
to the Naval Reserve. Furthermore, in Chapter IV, when the cost implications
of the Navy's and the DoD's proposed force mix alternatives are discussed, it
will become clearly evident that large substitutions of Reserve for Active
squadrons will also reduce the cost savings differential. In simple terms, if the
reserve component must be manned and operated on a "full-time" basis in
order for the Navy to meet its normal peacetime commitments, the savings
normally expected from placing forces/missions in the Reserve will not be
realized.
Chapter IV will examine VP active/reserve cost estimates and cost
comparisons based on the annual recurring operating and support costs
determined in Chapter III. The cost analysis will be appropriate for small
changes in the current force, but may underestimate large changes in the mix
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of active and reserve VP units for several reasons. A few of those reasons -
availability and accessibility - have already been discussed. The remaining
reasons will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.
C. CURRENT MARITIME PATROL (VP) STRUCTURE
The total maritime patrol force is currently composed of 24 fleet
squadrons and 13 reserve squadrons. With the CNO's imminent de-
commissioning of four fleet squadrons during FY-91, and the subsequent
transfer of their P-3C aircraft to the Naval Reserves, a total of 20 fleet
squadrons will be used as a base case in the fleet half of the comparative cost
analysis. [Ref. 8]
All fleet and reserve VP squadrons are CONUS based, with the fleet
squadrons being homeported at Moffett Field, California; Barbers Point,
Hawaii; Jacksonville, Florida; and Brunswick, Maine. The primary missions
of the fleet are to provide antisubmarine services for our Battle Groups, as well
as to patrol the coastal waters of the United States. They also provide a
variety of other services which include maritime patrol of the sea lanes,
defensive mining operations, drug interdiction surveillance, and search and
rescue missions.
To provide these services, the fleet squadrons each fly approximately
5,500 hours per year. The squadrons accomplish this with an authorized
squadron manning level of 63 Officers and 274 Enlisted full-time personnel
[Ref. 9], In addition, each fleet squadron is authorized the use of eight
P-3C aircraft to operate and maintain. Although two of the fleet squadrons
based out of Hawaii still operate P-3B aircraft, for the purposes of this study
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P-3C cost factors will be utilized. Only minor cost differences exist between the
two models, and are considered to be insignificant.
Each fleet squadron deploys overseas on the average of six months out of
each 18 month operational/training cycle. While deployed, the West Cost
squadrons support Seventh Fleet ops out of Diego Garcia, Japan, Okinawa,
Guam, and the Philippines. Third Fleet ops are supported from Adak, Alaska.
Meanwhile, East Coast squadrons routinely support Sixth Fleet ops out of
Spain, Italy, Iceland and Bermuda.
The 13 reserve VP squadrons are based coast to coast throughout the
United States from MofFett Field, California, to Jacksonville, Florida. Their
missions are identical to the fleets', but on a slightly smaller scale. Each
reserve squadron flies approximately 3,500 hours per year with the same
complement ofeight P-3 aircraft. All reserve squadrons fly P-3B model aircraft
with the exception of two squadrons which fly P-3C and P-3A models
respectively. As fleet squadrons are decommissioned, the current plan is for
them to transfer the updated P-3C aircraft to the reserves as part of the Total
Force modernization plan. Again, for analytic purposes all reserve squadrons
will be assumed to be operating eight P-3B aircraft.
To support their missions, the reserve squadrons are authorized a
squadron manning of 81 Officers and 313 Enlisted personnel. Of these totals,
only seven Officers and 105 Enlisted (or 28% of squadron personnel) are full-
time active duty TARs [Ref. 10]. The remaining Officer and Enlisted
corps are made up of drilling reservists (SELRES) [Ref. 9]. An interesting
aspect of the reserve squadron organization is that on average, 11 out of the
13 squadrons are commanded by a SELRES Commanding Officer and
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Executive Officer. In these cases the day-to-day management is performed by
a TAR Officer-in-Charge.
The reserve squadrons recruit the majority of their SELRES personnel
from the regular Navy P-3 community. Many of the pilots, Naval Flight
Officers and Enlisted Aircrewmen acquired their skills and qualifications while
serving out their active duty obligations. The SELRES Officer and Enlisted
ground personnel recruited are also closely aligned in both professional
experience and training background due to the commonality of working on the
same basic aircraft. Each reserve squadron deploys overseas one month (two
14-day ACDUTRA periods) out of each year to augment their fleet squadron
counterparts.
To form a meaningful cost analysis and comparison between an active and
reserve squadron, the ensuing cost model needs to estimate costs ofcomparable
units. Comparable units being defined as similar in manning, equipment and
having the same wartime missions [Ref. 6:p. 5]. The closeness in unit
structure, aircraft, and missions make the fleet and reserve P-3 squadrons
ideal units for cost comparison and analysis. Secondarily, although both units
differ slightly in tempo of operations, their similar geographic locations within
CONUS, and similar fleet augmentation support sites makes them prime
targets for further future Reserve force integration.
Chapter III will lay the groundwork for the P-3 Active/Reserve squadron
comparative cost analysis study. All appropriate cost definitions, details and
assumptions of the analysis will be reviewed and a framework for assessing
the personnel, equipment and Base Operating Support (BOS) costs of each
organization will be thoroughly developed.
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III. ANNUAL OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS OF ACTIVE AND
RESERVE P-3 UNITS: THE COST MODEL AND ANALYSIS
A. THE METHODOLOGY
In an attempt to achieve consistency and inclusiveness in costing, the core
of this analysis uses a method of costing and comparison of active/reserve
military forces developed and subsequently published by John F. Schank ofthe
RAND Corporation in 1986 [Ref. ll:p. 2]. RAND was sponsored by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to develop this methodology
because of increasing interest in Congress to compare costs of similar active
and reserve units [Ref. 11]. Mr. Schank stated that one of the objectives of his
work would be for others to follow this methodology in costing Operating and
Support Costs (O&S) for various military communities throughout the DOD.
This costing methodology does not include certain life-cycle costs such as P-3
research and development costs and P-3 procurement costs because such costs
are typically not a factor in active/reserve force mix decisions. These costs are
considered "sunk" (irrelevant) for purposes of this cost analysis [Ref. ll:p. 2].
Schank's analysis took him to the Army, Navy, and Air Force where he
conducted several case studies on various types of similar military units. The
particular study by which this thesis was patterned was Schank's analysis of
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active and reserve Navy F-4S squadrons conducted in 1983. This was the
logical model of choice since P-3 active and reserve squadrons are also Naval
aviation units with similar infrastructures. However, due to the uniqueness of
the P-3 community, several minor changes and deviations from Schank's model
were necessary and will be highlighted throughout the analysis.
To begin the analysis the intended focus will be on FY-90 P-3 Operating
and Support Costs (O&S). These costs are sometimes referred to as recurring
costs, direct costs, semivariable, or variable costs. Annual Recurring (O&S) cost
elements are separated into personnel-related costs and equipment-related
costs based on actual FY-90 dollar outlays as determined by available data
sources. The development ofdata sources and their references will be discussed
further throughout this chapter. Finally, non-recurring or fixed one-time
capital outlay costs which do not figure in this analysis will be discussed later
in Chapter IV. As defined by Schank, O&S costs are divided into four major
cost elements:
1. Personnel costs:
• Pay and allowances
• Military retirement accrual
• Flight pay
2. Other personnel (PCS, travel, bonuses, death gratuities and
hospitalization) and base support costs:
• Base operations
• Real property maintenance
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• Medical facilities support
3. Acquisition and training of replacement personnel
4. Equipment operating costs:
• Petroleum, oil, and lubricants
• Ordnance
• Maintenance supplies
• Replenishment spare parts
• Depot level maintenance
• Modifications
The tables incorporated in this analysis go through each ofthe four major
cost elements in arriving at per capita average cost factors and resource factors
such as personnel strengths, equipment supplies and spare parts [Ref. ll:p. 8].
The resultant "cost factors" and "resource factors" were then inserted into a
series oflinear estimating equations to calculate the different elements of cost.
In most cases the cost elements were estimated by multiplying a "resource
factor" (e.g., number of personnel, pieces of equipment) by a "cost factor" (i.e.,
actual cost per resource factor), with the resultant total costs transferred to a
final summary table (Table 1) where all costs were accumulated and totaled.
This final summary table is displayed now, and at the end of this chapter to
assist and guide the reader through the detailed analysis phase of the study.
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TABLE 1. NAVY P-3 ACTIVE/RESERVE SQUADRON OPERATING







Active Duty Officer 4,222,056 484,400
SELRES Enlisted 1,028,660
Active Duty Enlisted 7,742,147 3,140,640
Total 11,964,203 5,814,918 48.6%




Total 2,842,001 1,378,166 48.5%
III. REPLACEMENT ACQUISITION AND
TRAINING COSTS:
Pilot 4,568,924
Naval Flight Officer 1,551,799
Non Flight-Rated Officer 27,531 22,940
Enlisted 1,172,353 142,061
Special Active Duty Training 271,826
Total 7,320,607 436,827 6.0%
IV. EQUIPMENT OPERATING COSTS:
POL 3,458,432 1,307,736
Maintenance supplies 1,040,000 832,840
Replenishment spares 1,314,286 1,325,456
Depot maintenance 2,266,278 2,147,916
Modifications 1,073,493 1,047,006
Ordnance 1,599,208 343,726
Total equipment 10,751,697 7,004,680 65.1%
32,878,508 14,634,591 44.5% i
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B. PERSONNEL COSTS
Personnel costs for both the USN and USNK components of the Navy are
comprised of regular pay and allowances entitlements, military retirement
accruals, flight pay allowances and miscellaneous other pay allowances as
defined later in this section. Table 2 provides the reader with an upfront
composite summary of the VP active duty Officer and Enlisted per capita
personnel costs as compared with their VP reserve counterparts. Just how
these per capita costs were derived is explained in detail in the remaining part
of this section.
TABLE 2. NAVY PERSONNEL PER CAPITA COST FACTOR





USN Active Duty (from Table 7) 67,284 61,672
SELRES (from Table 12) 15,969 10,847
TAR (from Table 13) 69,200 69,200
ENLISTED
USN Active Duty (from Table 7) 29,835 27,418
SELRES (from Table 12) 5,936 4,190
TAR (from Table 13) 29,568 29,568
Active rated personnel receive flight pay.
SELRES (part time) factors include additional drills
For definition of the terms TAR, SELRES, and USN Active Duty see GLOSSARY
1. USN Pay and Allowances
The first step in deriving Table 2 was to arrive at a per capita pay
figure for non-flight USN Officers and Enlisted personnel. The basic procedure
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involved gathering appropriate pay data from the NMPC-711 Navy Manpower
Budget Office headed by Mr. Don Cunningham [Ref. 12]. An impressive
array of data (as shown in Table 3), represents the total pay and allowance
dollars expended on personnel in FY-90. Total pay and allowances
approximated $3.4 and $10.7 billion for Officer and Enlisted personnel
respectively.




Basic pay 2,360,431,000 6,948,984,000
Quarters 350,437,000 1,024,535,000
Housing, VHA 139,703,000 352,825,000
Subsistence 106,786,000 912,068,000
Incentive Qess flight pay) 32,172,000 102,834,000
Special Qess flight pay) 154,979,000 374,172„000
Allowances 45,094,000 306,353,000
Separation, Family 3,228,000 24,692,000
Social Security 214,883,000 643,266,000
Other, Misc., Death, Survivors
Benefits, Education
2,522,000 38,393,000
. Total 3,410,235,000 10,728,117,600
Strength (from Table 4) 72,090 502,530
Pay per capita ($) 47,298 21,348
Source: NMPC-711
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These total dollars were then divided by total FY-90 USN end
strength figures (Table 4) to arrive at the bottom line per capita figures for
USN Officers and Enlisted personnel. End strength data was obtained from
OP-130, OP-130C, OP-132C, NMPC-711, CNARF, and the Office of Civilian
Personnel [Refs. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].












Source: OP-130, OP-130C, OP-132C, NMPC-711,
CNARF Office of Civilian Personnel
2. USN and USNR Military Retirement
The next step was to calculate military retirement for USN and
USNR personnel. Schank did not include military retirement in his analysis
of Navy F-4S squadrons because he felt it did not change the overall cost ratio
significantly in units that are heavy in hardware. Retirement is generally a
smaller portion of overall costs in a capital intensive unit such as an aviation
squadron [Ref. ll:p. 37]. Schank found the effects of including retirement to
be greater in personnel intensive units such as an Army unit [Ref. ll:p. 37].
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Also, in 1983 DOD was not yet accruing costs for retirement as part of the
personnel costing equation. Nevertheless, this P-3 analysis does include
retirement costs as part of the personnel cost equation (DOD began officially
accruing retirement pay in 1985). Retirement accrual percentages for FY-90
were obtained from NMPC-711, Mr. Don Cunningham. These percentages were
developed by the DOD Office of the Actuary [Ref. 19], and accrued as
a percentage ofbasic pay. The duel accrual for FY-90 was 43.9% for active duty
and 13.4% for SELRES. Based on these percentages Table 5 was developed.





























3. USN Flight Pay
Since the majority of Officers and a large part of Enlisted personnel
in the P-3 community are flight-rated, a per capita flight pay factor had to be
developed. Table 6 summarizes the USN per capita flight pay calculations. The
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FY-90 total flight pay figures were obtained from NMPC-711, Mr. Don
Cunningham [Ref. 12]. As a special note, in Schank's study of Navy F-4S
squadrons, he also calculated a per capita figure for sea pay because of the
large percentage of personnel who qualified for it based on the amount of sea
duty required in F-4S squadrons [Ref. ll:p. 109]. P-3 squadron personnel, on
the other hand, usually do not qualify for sea pay and thus it was omitted from
the calculations.
TABLE 6. USN FLIGHT PAY FACTORS
($ FY-90)
OFFICER ENLISTED
Total flight pay 107,834,000 15,831,000
Number of flight-rated (from Table 4) 19,215 6,551
Cost per capita 5,612 2,417
Source: NMPC-711
At this point, all the information needed to calculate the final USN
pay and allowance factors in Table 7 can be obtained from data in Tables 3, 5,
and 6. Final Table 7 totals are then transferred to Table 2 (Navy Personnel
Cost Factor Summary) as shown earlier in the chapter.
4. SELRES Pay and Allowances
Attention now swings to the calculation of the SELRES pay and
allowances. Reserve pay is usually broken down by an average cost per day for
all ranks of officers and enlisted personnel. These costs per day are then
multiplied by participation rates which are calculated each fiscal year based
on historical data. The FY-90 costs per day and participation rates were
obtained from Mr. Ed Tweedy at the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Forces
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Pay and allowances per capita
(from Table 3)
47,298 21,348









Pay and allowances (from Table 3) 47,298 21,348




Headquarters (CNARF) located in New Orleans, Louisiana [Ref. 20].
Furthermore, the average SELRES pay must be multiplied by the required
number of "drills" specified per year to receive credit for retirement purposes.
There are two ways in which the SELRES earn these drills. First, each
SELRES is required to participate in two weeks (14 days) of active duty
training (ACDUTRA) each fiscal year. Second, most reserve units train (in
addition to ACDUTRA) one weekend a month where they are credited with two
drills for each weekend day of training. Thus, it is normal for a SELRES to
earn 14 drills for 14 days of ACDUTRA) per year and 48 regular drills for 12
weekends oftraining per year. In addition, SELRES flight pay is calculated on
an average cost per day basis using the same participation rates and number
of drills as used for the basic pay and allowances calculations [Ref. 20]. Flight
pay calculations are included in Table 8 along with SELRES pay and
allowances.
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TABLE 8. SELRES AVERAGE DAILY PAY FACTORS
(ACDUTRA AND DRILLS)
($ FY-90)
COST PER PARTICDPATION NUMBER COST PER
DAY ($) RATE OF DRILLS YEAR($)
PAY AND ALLOWANl
Officer
ACDUTRA 155.77 .99 14 2,159
Weekend drills
Total
135.80 .99 48 6,453
8,612
Enlisted
ACDUTRA 63.44 .92 14 817
Weekend drills
Total




ACDUTRA 21.00 .99 14 291
Weekend drills
Total
21.00 .99 48 998
1,289
Enlisted
ACDUTRA 5.50 .92 14 71
Weekend drills
Total
5.50 .92 48 243
314
Source: CNARF Financial Management Office
5. SELRES Other Pay Factors
There are also other pay and allowance factors which SELRES
receive, such as clothing allowances and subsistence pay. This cost can be
easily calculated on a per capita basis by dividing FY-90 total expenditures
obtained from CNARF by the SELRES end strengths from Table 4. These
calculations are shown in Table 9 [Ref. 21].
6. SELRES Accumulation of Costs and Retirement Accrual
Table 10 summarizes the calculations ofSELRES pay from Tables 8
and 9, and also adds in the SELRES military retirement accrual which was
derived in Table 5.
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USNR Strength (from Table 4)








Source: CNARF Financial Management Office





Pay (from Table 8) 8,612 3,195
Other (From Table 9)




Pay and allowances 8,634 3,342




SELECTED RESERVE RETIREMENT ACCRUAL
NON FLIGHT-RATED
Pay and Allowances 8,634 3,342
Retirement (from Table 5)




Pay and allowances 9,923 3,656
Retirement (from Table 5)




7. SELRES Additional Drills
Another cost common to Naval Reserve aviation units is "additional
drills." Reserve squadron personnel are often required to operate more than 12
weekends and two active duty weeks per year to maintain currency and
readiness. In fact, P-3 Officer and Enlisted flight-rated personnel are
authorized to perform 48 "additional drills" during each fiscal year. Non-rated
Officer and Enlisted personnel are authorized 12 additional drills each fiscal
year. The same average cost per day rates for base pay and flight pay as used
in Table 8 are used to determine the additional reserve pay cost factors
[Ref. 22]. However, the participation rate for additional drills varies
greatly and is less predictable than participation rates for ACDUTRA and
weekend drills. Based on interviews with CNARF and Reserve Wing
Commanders [Ref. 23] [Ref. 24], a "proxy" participation rate of
65% was applied. This was well below the 99% and 89% rates Schank used for
additional drills in his analysis of F-4S squadrons. However, he stated in a
footnote that he suspected the rate was actually closer to 60% [Ref. ll:p. 115].
Nevertheless, from recent experiences in the field it is firmly believed that 65%
is a legitimate rate, and is the rate used in Table 11. In a normal squadron an
observer would usually see about one-quarter ofthe flight-rated personnel use
all 48 additional drills, one-half would use about two-thirds of their additional
drills, and the remaining quarter would use about one-fifth of their additional
drills.
Table 12 is constructed by simply bringing forward the base pay,
flight pay, retirement accruals, and additional drill totals from Tables 10 and
11 to arrive at a total SELRES pay and allowances for flight and non-flight-
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Non-flight officer pay 135.80 .65 12 1,059
Non-flight enlisted pay 53.84 .65 12 420
Source: CNARF Financial Management Office
rated personnel. These totals are then transferred to the Navy Personnel Cost
Factor Summary (Table 2).
TABLE 12. SELRES TOTAL PAY AND ALLOWANCE FACTORS
($ FY-90)
TYPE OF PERSONNEL OFFICERS ENLISTED
FLIGHT-RATED RESERVIST
No additional drills (from Table 10)








No additional drills (from Table 10)








8. TAR Pay and Allowances
The remaining personnel cost factors to determine for Table 2 belong
to the TAR (Training and Administration of the Reserve) personnel. TAR
personnel are the active duty reservists who train, administer, and coordinate
the activities of the SELRES on a full-time basis. In Table 13 a total dollar
figure for TAR Officer and Enlisted pay for FY-90 was obtained from NMPC-
711, Mr. Don Cunningham [Ref. 25]. These totals contain all the pay
categories observed in Table 3 for USN personnel, plus flight pay and
retirement accruals. The totals do not include travel, death, gratuities,
hospitalization, and bonuses which are later calculated in Table 15. It should
be noted that TAR pay factors are slightly higher than their active duty
counterparts primarily because ofhigher average ranks in the TAR Officer and
Enlisted rates. This is because most TAR personnel have completed prior
active duty military obligations, and therefore enter the TAR program at a
more senior rank. The TAR pay and allowance totals are divided by TAR FY-90
end strengths from Table 4 to reach the per capita pay factors shown in Table
13. These per capita pay factors are then transferred to the Navy Personnel
Cost Factor Summary (Table 2).
TABLE 13. USNR TAR PAY AND ALLOWANCE FACTORS
($ FY-90)
OFFICERS ENLISTED
Pay and allowances 161,928,000 601,180,000
Strength (from Table 4) 2,340 20,332
Cost per capita ($) (to Table 2) 69,200 29,568
Source: NMPC-711
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9. Summation of Pay and Allowance Factors
Once per capita pay factors for USN active duty, SELRES, and TAR
personnel have been summarized in Tables 7, 12, and 13, and transferred to
Table 2, these figures are then multiplied by the number of personnel found
in "the average P-3 squadron" (Table 14). These squadron personnel numbers
were obtained from various 1000/2 Squadron Manning Documents originating
from both the Commander Reserve Patrol Wing Pacific [Ref. 24] and the Chief
of Naval Air Reserve Force [Ref. 23].













Naval Flight Officers 2
Non-flight 1











Total enlisted 274 313
Source: CNARF, COMRESPATWINGPAC
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An illustration of this calculation uses the USN active duty Officer
category as an example. Notice on Table 14 that there are 60 flight-rated
Officers and three non-flight-rated Officers in a "typical squadron." These two
numbers are then multiplied by the active duty flight and non-flight rate pay
factors of $67,284 and $61,672 respectively (Table 2).
Flight-rated Officers = 60 x $67,284 = $4,037,040
Non-flight-rated Officers = 3 x $61,672 = $ 185,016
Total Officers $4,222,056
A total of $4,222,056 in active duty Officer costs are therefore transferred to
the Final Summary Table (Table 1) for accumulation with the other major cost
categories. Pay and allowances for USN Enlisted and USNR Officer and
Enlisted personnel were calculated the same way as the above example, and
likewise transferred to Table 1.
C. OTHER PERSONNEL AND BASE SUPPORT COSTS
"Other personnel costs" consist of permanent change of station (PCS)
expenditures for USN personnel, and travel, death gratuities, hospitalization,
and bonuses for USNR personnel. The "base support costs" consist of costs for
base operations, real property maintenance, and an allocation ofNavy medical
system costs. Table 15 provides a complete summary of personnel and base
operating and support costs, the calculation of which will be discussed in
detail.
1. Other Personnel Costs
USN "other personnel costs" can be simply thought of as permanent
change of station (PCS) expenditures for FY-90. These expenditures were
divided by total FY-90 USN end strength figures obtained from Table 4 to
arrive at a per capita cost factor. The PCS expenditures were obtained from
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TABLE 15. OTHER PERSONNEL AND BASE OPERATING
AND SUPPORT COST SUMMARY
($ FY-90)
COST FACTORS FLIGHT AND
NON-FLIGHT RATED
OFFICER
USN active (from Tables 16 & 18) 9,639
SELRES (from Tables 17 & 19) 4,218
TAR (from Tables 17 & 19) 5,103
ENLISTED
USN active (from Tables 16 & 18) 8,156
SELRES (from Tables 17 & 19) 3,281
TAR (from Tables 17 & 19) 3,313
NMPC-711, Mr. Don Cunningham [Ref. 12]. Pertinent calculations are shown
in Table 16.
TABLE 16. USN OTHER PERSONNEL COST FACTORS (PCS)
($ FY-90)
OFFICERS ENLISTED
Permanent change of station
Strength (from Table 4)





The USNR "other personnel costs" were broken down into categories
of TAR and SELRES personnel, with per capita cost factors figured for each.
Again, these costs consisted of travel, death gratuities, hospitalization, and
were obtained from CNARF, Mr. Ed Tweedy [Ref. 26]. These costs,
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much like Table 16, were divided by reserve end strength figures obtained from
Table 4. The per capita figures for each category are summed at the bottom of
Table 17, and serve as the overall USNR "other personnel" cost factors.
TABLE 17. USNR OTHER PERSONNEL COST FACTORS
($ FY-90)
SELECTED RESERVE TAR
OFFICER ENLISTED OFFICER ENLISTED
TRAVEL 42,629,000 69,559,000 4,587,000 16,322,000
Strength (from Table 4)
COST PER CAPITA ($)
26,919 96,744 2,340 20,332




Strength (from Table 4)
Cost per capita ($)
26,919 96,744 N/A 20,332
15 8 1
BONUSES 2,974,000 4,400,000 1,483,000
Strength (from Table 4)
Cost per capita ($)
26,919 96,744 2,340 N/A
110 45 634
Total general cost 1,709 772 2,594 804
per capita ($)
Source: CNARF Financial Management Office
2. Base Operating and Support Costs (BOS)
Both the USN and USNR "other personnel" cost factors determined
in Tables 16 and 17 were added to the cost factors generated for Base
Operation and Support (BOS) before being transferred to Table 15. According
to Schank, the BOS costs are an attempt to account for the marginal increase
in base operating costs attributed to having that additional unit located on the
base [Ref. ll:p. 117]. These costs were arrived at on a per capita basis.
Research in the area ofBase Operating and Support Costs led to OP-823/NCB-
3, the Resource Allocation and Analysis Division of the Office of the
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Comptroller of the Navy, Washington, D.C. [Ref. 27]. Through phone
interviews with Mr. Chris Heyde, FY-90 base operating data was obtained via
facsimile transmission. The information came in the form of obligated
transactions for FY-90 ofthe O&MN and O&MNR accounts for the five budget
activities which list obligations for base operations, maintenance of real
property,and Naval medical costs. Schank did not assign any medical costs to
Reserve BOS, due to the complex methods of accounting in the Naval medical
system. However, this study made an attempt to allocate a portion of the total
medical costs to the USNR BOS table. This allocation method will be shown
later in Table 20.
Table 18 sums up all the base operations categories for the five
budget activities which are in the O&MN account. The base operations costs
were broken down into many subcategories of specific costs which were too
numerous to list in the table. These categories consisted of such things as
utilities, engineering support, retail supply operations, base housing
operations, communications, security, hazardous waste, MWR, administration,
and others. The maintenance of real property account was summed as well,
and consisted of MRP, minor construction, and physical security ofMRP. The
divisor for base operations and maintenance of real property was a
combination of both military and civilian end strengths from Table 4. Many
civilians work on bases and are considered as equal "base cost drivers" with
military personnel. Finally, the allocation ofUSN medical costs were added to
Table 18. The medical costs were divided by military personnel only, due to the
limited access civilian employees have to the Naval medical system.
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TABLE 18. USN BASE OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST FACTORS
($ FY-90)
Base operations 2,522,687,000
Maintenance of real property 901,672,000
Total BOS 3,424,359,000
Strength (military & civilian from Table 4) 882,708
Per capita BOS ($) 3,879
USN medical cost allocation (from Table 20) 1,974,224,760
Strength (military only from Table 4) 574,620
Per capita medical ($) 3,436
Total USN per capita BOS and medical costs ($) 7,315
Source: OP-823/NCB-3
In Table 19, the same methodology was used to calculate the USNR
Base Operating and Support Cost factors from the O&MNR obligated funds
data received from OP-823/NCB-3 [Ref. 27].
TABLE 19. USNRBASE OPERATINGAND SUPPORT COSTFACTORS
($ FY-90)
Base operations 184,958,000
Maintenance of real property 64,627,000
Total BOS 249,585,000
Strength (military and civilian from Table 4) 148,744
Per capita BOS ($) 1,678
USNR medical cost allocation (from Table 20) 121,555,240
Strength (military only from Table 4) 146,335
Per capita medical ($) 831
Total USNR per capita BOS and medical costs ($) 2,509
Source: OP-823/NCB-3
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3. Medical Cost Allocation to BOS
In calculating the USN and USNR allocated medical costs found in
Tables 18 and 19, a new allocation method had to be derived because of the
uniqueness of accounting in the Naval medical system. A direct break out of
USN and USNR medical costs would have involved contacting all the regional
medical hospitals. They are apparently the highest level of authority which
maintains the data in that form. In phone conversations with the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) [Ref. 28], it was learned that all Naval
Reserve medical clinic charges on reserve bases are charged to the nearest
Naval hospital. Thus, all Naval Reserve medical costs wind up in the regular
Navy O&MN budget. Therefore, a sound method was devised for allocating
USN and USNR medical costs using numbers ofUSN and USNR personnel as
the allocation base. Table 20 serves as a summary of this allocation process.
Note that final medical cost allocation figures of $121,555,240 for the Reserves
and $1,974,224,760 for the regular Navy were appropriately transferred to
Tables 18 and 19.
As a concluding note to Table 20, it should be pointed out that
SELRES end strength was calculated as a percentage of the fiscal year an
average selected reservist has access to the Naval medical system. This was
accomplished by figuring that the average selected reservist drills 14 days of
ACDUTRA and 24 days ofweekend duty for a total of 38 active duty days per
year. This equates to a SELRES being on active duty 10.4% of the year
(38/365=10.4%). Multiplying this active duty participation rate by the total
number of SELRES personnel in FY-90 (Table 4), yields a SELRES end
strength of 12,861 [(26,919 + 96,744) x .104].
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TABLE 20. ALLOCATION OF USN AND USNR MEDICAL COSTS
($ FY-90)
Medical care in regional defense facilities 255,019,000
Care in non-defense facilities 1,312,493,000
Other health activities 140,699,000
Dental care activities 29,080,000
Station hospitals and medical clinics
Total unallocated medical costs
358,489,000
2,095,780,000
SELRES end strength (from Table 4)* (26,919 + 96,744) x .104 = 12,861*
TAR end strength (from Table 4)
Total USNR end strength
22,672
35,533
Total USN end strength 574,620
% USNR of medical costs 35,533/610,153 = .058
% USN of medical costs 574,620/310,153 = .942
USNR medical cost allocation .058 x 2,095,780,000 = 121,555,240
USN medical cost allocation .942 x 2,095,780,000 = 1,974,224,760
* See text for explanation of how SELRES end strength was determined as a percentage of time per
year on active duty.
The final process ofcompleting Table 15 involved the simple addition
of the USN cost factors from Tables 16 and 18, and the addition ofUSNR cost
factors from Tables 17 and 19. These aggregated per capita cost factors, when
multiplied by the average number of Officer and Enlisted personnel in a
squadron (Table 14), resulted in total USN/USNR Other Personnel and BOS
Costs for FY-90 that were then transferred to Table 1.
D. REPLACEMENT ACQUISITION AND TRAINING COST
What costs are involved in the replacement of personnel who leave a
squadron during the year? This replacement cost of personnel is what this
section of the chapter attempts to determine. Replacement costs consist of
recruiting and training costs multiplied by a calculated turnover factor for
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average USN and USNR units. Table 21 is the summary table ofReplacement
Acquisition and Training Costs for both USN and USNR personnel. This
summary table also includes a special category of costs called special active
duty training (SPECACDUTRA), which applies to SELRES components
exclusively. SPECACDUTRA brings a SELRES service member on additional
active duty to accomplish training in a special required school, or to support
current operations.





Acquisition and Training Cost
Pilot 63,836
Naval Flight Officer 32,400
Non-flight Officer 9,177 4,588
Enlisted 4,279 454
USNR Special Active Duty Training
SELRES officer 2,861
SELRES enlisted 289
*NOTE: These replacement factors represent acquisition and training costs per student, times the
turnover rates found in Table 26.
Notice in Table 21 the reserves do not assume any training costs for pilots
and Naval Flight Officers. This is because Naval Reserve aviators are all
required to have prior service and training which is most likely obtained while
on active duty in the regular Navy. Most nonaviator reservists have regular
Navy training as well, and this is why the USN bares the brunt ofthe majority
of acquisition and training costs.
38
1. Enlisted Acquisition and Training Costs
These costs consist of per capita recruiting, recruit training (boot
camp), Navy "A" school training, and the more specialized Naval Aviation
Maintenance Training Group (NAMTRAGRU) and Fleet Aviation Specialized
Operational Training Group (FASOTRAGRU) training. The first step in the
process of assessing enlisted costs consisted of contacting the National Navy
Recruiting Command comptroller in Washington, D.C. Their representative,
Commander Edison, provided a FY-90 per capita recruiting cost figure of
$4,350 [Ref. 29]. She stated, however, that this number may be
artificially high due to a lower than average number of assessions in FY-90
(72,000 vice 95,000 in a "normal year"). A "normal year" figure was stated to
be approximately $3,100, but for the purposes of this study the actual number
of $4,350 was used and entered on Table 22.
Next, to access the average cost of recruit training the Naval
Education and Training Program Management Support Activity (NETPMSA)
in Pensacola, Florida was contacted. Here, Mrs. Pat Smith, provided the study
with a FY-90 average cost per graduate from the three recruit training centers
located in San Diego, Great Lakes, and Orlando [Ref. 30]. This cost
accounted for an expenditure of $4,939 per recruit. Additionally, NETPMSA
provided the FY-90 Enlisted "A" school costs for all the enlisted ratings in a
typical P-3 squadron [Ref. 31]. To compute the average "A" school cost
per student, a weighted average of each "A" school cost (based on the average
number of personnel in each rating in an average P-3 squadron) was used.
This cost worked out to be $12,180 per student. Finally, NETPMSA provided
the specialized P-3 maintenance training costs originating from NAMTRAGRU,
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and an "estimated" cost per student for FASO training was obtained from the
Officer in Charge of the FASO training detachment at NAS Moffett Field
[Ref. 32] [Ref. 33]. These costs combined to show a figure of
2,170 per student.
TABLE 22. ACQUISITION AND TRAINING COSTS FOR
NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL
($ FY-90)
Recruiting per capita 4,350
Recruit training 4,939
"A" school training 12,180
NAMTRAGRU/FASO training 2,170
Total per capita 23,639
Source: NETPMSA, Naval Recruiting Command,
NAMTRAGRUDET MOFFETT, FASO DET MOFFETT
The per capita cost for P-3 Enlisted acquisition and training totaled
$23,639 for FY-90. In translating this cost to Table 1 for USN personnel, this
figure of$23,639 was multiplied by 274 enlisted personnel (Table 14), times an
18.1% turnover rate for USN (Table 26), to yield a total cost of $1,172,353
(23,639 x 274 x .181). Thus, $1,172,353 was transferred to Table 1 for USN
enlisted replacement acquisition and training. The same method was used to
determine the USNR figure of $142,061 (23,639 x 313 x .0192).
2. Officer Acquisition and Training Costs
Table 23 summarizes the assessment of Naval Officer acquisition
costs for FY-90. The cost per graduate figures are projections for FY-90 based
on the latest FY-89 figures obtained from OP-114 in Washington, D.C.
[Ref. 34]. The FY-89 figures were indexed upward by 4% to arrive at
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the cost per graduate figures shown in the far right hand column. The 4%
indexing rate was suggested by the financial management department of
CNARF as a figure that was used for government indexing in 1990 [Ref. 26].
Thus, the cost of a typical Naval Academy graduate was determined to be
$159,640 (153,500 x 1.04).
TABLE 23. NAVY OFFICER ACQUISITION PROJECTIONS
AND COSTS
TRAINING SOURCE











Naval Academy 19% 24% 25% 159,640
ROTC 36% 35% 30% 66,144
Aviation Officer Candidate
School (AOCS)
31% 28% 35% 21,239
Other Sources (AVROC, ECP,
Interservice, NAVCAD)
14% 13% 10% 20,671
Source: OP-114 and OP-130E2
The calculated percentages from each training source for pilots and
Naval Flight Officers was based on the actual number ofFY-90 graduates from
each source. The graduate figures were obtained from OP-130E2, Commander
Jerry Ellison [Ref. 35]. Due to the non-availability of data, the
percentages used for non-rated aviation Officers were "proxy percentages" that
Schank used in his 1983 study [Ref. ll:p. 121]. These percentages were felt to
be reasonably accurate, with any error having only a minimal effect because
of the small number of non-rated aviation Officers in each P-3 squadron. Each
source of training percentage was then multiplied by the cost per graduate,
and then summed as shown below using a typical pilot as an example:
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.19 x $159,640 = $30,332 Naval Academy
.36 x $66,144 = $23,812 ROTC
.31 x $21,239 = $6,584 AOCS
.14 x $20,671 = $2,894 Other
$63,622 (cost to acquire one pilot)
The derived costs to acquire each type of Officer were then entered in the
acquisition column of Table 24.
TABLE 24. NAVY OFFICER ACQUISITION AND TRAINING COSTS
($ FY-90)




Pilot 63,622 227,302 71,689 362,613
Naval Flight Officer (NFO) 70,101 87,605 27,032 184,738
Non-rated Officer 69,253 30,496 N/A 99,749
3. Officer Initial Flight Training Costs
As evident from Table 24, the training cost portion for Officers is
divided into two distinct parts: (1) initial flight training (training costs from
commissioning to wings), and (2) fleet replacement squadron (FRS) costs
(training costs from wings to fleet squadron placement). Specific FRS costs in
the P-3 community are those incurred at VP-30 and VP-31 in NAS
Jacksonville, Florida, and NAS MofFett Field, California, respectively.
Initial FY-89 flight training costs were obtained from the Chief of
Naval Aviation Training (CNATRA) in Corpus Christi, Texas [Ref. 36].
Once again, due to non-availability of FY-90 data, the latest FY-89 costs were
indexed up by 4% (i.e., for a pilot: $218,560 x 1.04 = $227,302). Furthermore,
the initial training costs for non-rated Officers (Aviation Maintenance and
Aviation Intelligence Officers) of $30,496 was a "proxy figure" based on
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estimates of maintenance and training costs from P-3 Wing and FRS
Maintenance Officers. Once more, it is believed that any error in this category
would be small, and the impact would be minimal due to the small numbers
of non-rated Officers in a typical P-3 squadron.
4. FRS Flight Training Costs
It is not certain whether Schank's study on F-4S squadrons
incorporated FRS training costs. In lieu of this possible deficiency, this study
attempts to assign costs to the FRS even though it can become a very difficult
task. According to OP-593 in Washington, D.C., all FRS costs are based on
pilot costs per flight hour since a majority of a pilot's training syllabus occurs
in the cockpit. Similarly, NFO's conduct the vast majority of their training
flights in the back of the P-3 concurrently with pilot training flights. Thus, by
multiplying the FY-90 aircraft cost per hour for each FRS squadron (VP-30,
VP-31) times the number of hours in each pilot syllabus category, times the
number of FY-90 FRS student pilots in each category, total flight costs of
$12,516,462 and $7,693,350 for VP-30 and VP-31 respectively are calculated
[Ref. 37]. A portion of these FRS costs were then allocated for NFO
flight training to arrive at a pilot flight training cost of $16,896,412, and a
NFO flight training cost of $3,313,400. These figures are divided by the actual
number of FY-90 students, to arrive at a per capita figure of $51,829 per pilot
and $10,899 per NFO [Ref. 37].
5. FRS Simulator Costs
Simulator training costs for FY-90 were obtained from VP-31, Mr.
Niel Collins, NAS Moffett Field, California [Ref. 38]. The cost per hour
for simulator use was $53. Multiplying this figure by a FY-90 utilization of
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20,713 hours, yielded a total VP-31 cost of $4,980,400. This simulator cost was
again allocated among pilots and NFO's based upon an estimated percentage
ofusage. Estimates ofusage among pilots and NFOs were obtained from VP-31
Officers based on experience only. From this source the usage rate was
allocated on a basis of 65% pilot and 35% NFO. Thus, by taking the total
simulator cost of $4,980,400, and dividing it by the number of FY-90 VP-31
students (based on the above usage rate), a per capita figure of $19,860 per
pilot and $11,468 per NFO was obtained. An additional FASO ground school
cost of $4,665 per NFO was added to complete the cost estimates [Ref. 33]. The
total gambit of FRS costs are captured in Table 25, and final totals are
transferred to Table 24 under the heading of FRS training.
TABLE 25. PILOT AND NFO FRS TRAINING COST ESTIMATES
($ FY-90)









Source: VP-31, OP-593, FASO DET MOFFETT
The totals for each type of Officer in Table 24 were multiplied by the
number of pilots and NFOs per squadron (Table 14), times the respective
turnover factors from Table 26. Subsequent total costs were transferred to
Table 1. Using pilots as an example: $362,613 (pilot acquisition and training
cost) x 36 pilots (Table 14) x .35 (turnover rate, Table 26) = $4,568,924 (pilot
replacement cost per squadron).
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6. Turnover Factors
This section addresses the development of Table 26 and the turnover
factors. Turnover factors measure the replacement rate of all personnel in both
active and reserve P-3 squadrons who do not possess prior service experience.
The reason replacement costs for USNR pilots and NFOs indicates zero is
because of the prior service experience and qualification requirements to fly
reserve aircraft. The calculation of each remaining category turnover factor is
summarized in Table 26.
TABLE 26. NAVY PERSONNEL TURNOVER FACTORS
PERSONNEL CATEGORY USN USNR
ENLISTED
Losses 91,169 29,946
% without prior service 100% 6.2%
Strength (from Table 4) 502,530 96,744
Turnover rate .181 .0192
NON-RATED OFFICERS
Losses 4,898 3,626
% without prior service 100% 29%
Strength (from Table 4) 52,875 22,649
Turnover rate .092 .046
FLIGHT-RATED OFFICER
FRS graduates 630
Fleet pilots/NFOs 1,800 —
Turnover rate .35
Source: OP- 132, CNARF
The USN enlisted losses (91,169) were obtained from OP- 132, and the
USNR enlisted losses (29,946) were received from CNARF [Ref. 15] [Ref. 17].
These figures were then multiplied by the percentage of replacement of those
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losses who do not have prior service. Approximately 100% of all USN losses are
replaced by personnel who do not have prior service. However, only a very
small percentage of USNR enlisted replacements (6.2%) do not have prior
service and this dramatically reduces USNR training costs. The enlisted figure
of 6.2% was derived by obtaining the FY-90 number of SELRES (6,035)
without prior service from CNARF [Ref. 17] and dividing that figure by
enlisted SELRES end strength (96,744). As an example, the USNR enlisted
turnover rate would be calculated as follows: (29,946 x .062)/96,744 = .0192.
A similar USNR percentage without prior service for non-rated
Officers was developed by obtaining the number of FY-90 Officers recruited
without prior experience from the Reserve Officer Recruiting Command in New
Orleans [Ref. 39], and dividing that figure by non-rated Officer end
strength (Table 4).
Finally, the USN flight-rated Officer percentage was developed based
on a P-3 community level only, vice a Navy-wide level as was the case with
previous parts of Table 26. The FY-90 FRS graduates were comprised of 326
pilots and 304 NFOs, for a total of 630 graduates [Ref. 37]. This number was
divided by a total of 1,800 fleet pilots and NFOs from all fleet squadrons, Fleet
Replacement Squadrons (FRS) and extraneous P-3 commands. Thus,
630/1,800 = .35 flight-rated Officer turnover rate. As previously mentioned, all
reserve pilots and NFOs have prior experience and are listed as zero in Table
26.
7. Special Active Duty
The last factor in this section on Acquisition and Training Costs is
a reserve only cost called Special Active Duty For Training (SPECACDUTRA).
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SPECACDUTRA is additional active duty a SELRES servicemember receives
during the year for such things as career development, schools, refresher or
proficiency training, special exercises, service missions, or operational training.
Table 27 was developed by obtaining the FY-90 total SPECACDUTRA manday
expenditures from CNARF, Commander Mike Filkins [Ref. 10]. According to
Commander Filkins, 15,640 mandays of SPECACDUTRA were used in FY-90
by all P-3 reserve squadrons. This total included Officer and Enlisted mandays,
where one Officer day equated to 1.9 Enlisted days. The cost per Officer day
was $226, and per Enlisted day was $122. Thus, the total FY-90 expenditure
for SPECACDUTRA was computed to be $3,534,640 (15,640 x $226). Taking
this figure and dividing it by the 13 reserve squadrons provided a per squadron
SPECACDUTRA cost of $271,895. Additionally, SPECACDUTRA dollars were
allocated among Officer and Enlisted by solving the following system of
equations:
(1) $122 (# Enlisted days) + $226 (# Officer days) = $3,534,640
(2) 1.9 (# Enlisted days) = 1 Officer day
Solving the equations provides an approximate allocation of $782,057 for
Enlisted and $2,752,680 for Officer SPECACDUTRA in FY-90. Next, these
dollar amounts are divided by the P-3 FY-90 SELRES end strength numbers
to get the per capita figures shown in Table 27.
As a last step, these per capita figures are then transferred to Table
21 and multiplied by the P-3 reserve squadron personnel strengths (Table 14).
The resultant total of $271,826 per squadron was then transferred to Table 1.
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P-3 SELRES end strength




Source: CNARF VP Program Manager
E. EQUIPMENT OPERATING COSTS
In capital intensive units such as Naval aviation squadrons, the most
expensive costs are those incurred to operate and maintain the equipment.
These costs consist of variable costs which are tied to each squadron's
operating tempo, plus certain fixed maintenance costs. In the present system,
because USNR P-3 squadrons fly approximately 64% ofthe annual flight hours
ofUSN P-3 squadrons, the USNR squadron's variable costs are less. However,
because of the high fixed costs incurred by all P-3 squadrons in maintaining
their aircraft, this category has the highest USN to USNR ratio as shown in
Table 1 (65.1%).
The Operating and Maintenance Costs considered included petroleum, oil
and lubrication (POL), maintenance material, replenishment spares,depot level
costs ofSDLM, engines and components, aircraft modifications, and ordnance.
The availability of data for these costs at times seemed scarce and were
ultimately derived from several different sources. Yet, there is great confidence
in the totals, and it is felt they fairly represent FY-90 P-3 equipment costs.
Table 28 (P-3 Aircraft Equipment Cost Factors) is displayed on page 49,
and a discussion of how the table was developed follows.
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TABLE 28. NAVY P-3 AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT COST FACTORS
($ FY-90)
USN USNR
Flying hours/aircraft/year 694 443
Cost/squadron/year for:
Training ordnance 1,599,208 343,726
Modifications 1,073,493 1,047,006
Depot, SDLM 663,058 561,000
Depot, engine and components 1,603,220 1,586,916
Costs/flying hour for:
POL 623 369
Maintenance material 187 235
Replenishment spares 237 374
Source: OP-20 Report, COMRESPATWINGPAC, COMPATWINGSPAC, CNARF
Initially, to follow as closely as possible to Schank's methodology, the
variable costs for USN P-3 aircraft (such as POL, maintenance material, and
spares) had to be broken into costs per flying hour, since these figures
originally were provided in total fiscal year dollar numbers only. Dividing these
total variable costs by 694 flight hours per USN aircraft (line 1 of Table 28),
provided the necessary breakdown of cost per flight hour. This allowed for a
convenient comparison of USN cost data to USNR cost data which was
submitted at the outset in cost per hour form. It should be kept in mind that
for calculating totals a primary authorized aircraft (PAA) level of eight aircraft
per squadron was used. Also, when comparing USN and USNR squadrons in
this table, keep in mind that the reserves predominantly fly cheaper operating
P-3B's and the regular Navy the more costly P-3C's. The USN flying hours
were obtained from the Navy OP-20 report (Flying Hour Projection System),
which showed 5,552 flying hours per squadron per year, or 694 flying hours per
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aircraft. The USNR flying hours were obtained from the Commander Reserve
Patrol Wing Pacific Maintenance Department which indicated an average
squadron flew 3,547 hours in FY-90, or 443 hours per aircraft [Ref. 40].
These numbers were considered fairly representative of all USN and USNR P-
3 squadrons in FY-90.
1. Training Ordnance
USN and USNR training ordnance figures for FY-90 were also
obtained from the Commander Reserve Patrol Wing Pacific Maintenance
Department [Ref. 40]. These figures represented a total of $38,381,001 for all
24 USN squadrons, and $4,468,438 for the 13 reserve squadrons. This breaks
down to a total of $1,599,208 and $343,726 being spent on training ordnance
by each USN and USNR squadron respectively.
2. Modifications
Aircraft modifications were extremely hard to nail down. These costs
consisted of annual airframes changes (AFC), aircraft avionics changes (AVC),
and aircraft accessory changes (AAC). Modifications are apparently not tracked
by USN and USNR, and had to be allocated. All costs are accumulated into one
set of obligations. Thus, it was necessary to allocate total obligations for FY-90
to USN and USNR P-3 forces using numbers of aircraft as the allocation base.
From the data received it was impossible to decipher specific P-3B from P-3C
modifications. To complicate matters, the data (obtained from the Naval
Avionics Depot Maintenance, code 052A, Mr. Bill Baumgartner) was FY-90
budgetary data for planned obligations [Ref. 41]. These FY-90
obligations were "3 year money" totals which, even though obligated in 1990,
may not actually be expended until as late as 1992. Therefore, the total figure
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of $48,611,000 of planned obligations used in this study may err slightly from
the actual expenditures made in 1990. Table 29 details the allocation method.


























Source: Navy OP-20 Report, Flying Hour Projection System
The numbers ofaircraft were obtained from the previously mentioned
Navy OP-20 report (Flying Hour Projection System). The miscellaneous P-3
category consisted of EP-3s, TP-3s, RP-3s, UP-3s, VP-3s, and FRS P-3s. The
$48,611,000 budget total obligation for FY-90 was then multiplied by each
respective percentage to obtain the allocation amount for each P-3 category.
Finally, the USN total was divided by 24 squadrons and the USNR total by 13
squadrons to obtain the per squadron modification costs of $1,073,493 and
$1,047,006 respectively. These figures are listed on Tables 1 and 28.
3. Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance
Scheduled depot level maintenance (SDLM) is the scheduled rework
of the airframes at certain programmed intervals. For P-3s the intervals are
every 46 months, with the duration ofrework averaging about 180 days. Other
work that is performed at the depot level consists of engine and component
rework which will be discussed later. The USN SDLM costs were derived with
information obtained from Mr. Ken Klass in the Planning Office of the Naval
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Air Rework Facility at NAS Alameda [Ref. 42]. Cost information and
allocation calculations are listed in Table 30.








































Source: NARF Planning Office, NAS Alameda
Mr. Klass provided numbers of aircraft reworked, manhours per
aircraft, rates per hour, and a material flat rate of $200,000 per hour. The
total as shown in Table 30 was then divided by the number ofUSN squadrons
to yield a per squadron cost of $663,058. This cost was entered in Table 28.
Specific FY-90 USNR SDLM costs of $561,000 per reserve squadron were
obtained from ADCS Johnson, code 5724, CNARF.
4. POL, Maintenance Material, Replenishment Spares
POL, maintenance material, and replenishment spare costs forUSNR
P-3 forces were received directly from ADCS Johnson in the cost per hour form
shown in Table 28. USN costs for these same categories were more difficult to
access. Information concerning these costs were obtained from LCDR Sam
Wood, Logistics Officer, Commander Patrol Wings Pacific at NAS Moffett Field
[Ref. 43]. His recommended formulation for totaling the cost data was
used. The totals he provided were regional in that they applied to the NAS
Moffett Field USN squadrons. In the absence of reliable east coast costing
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data, these west coast averages were extended to represent all USN P-3
squadrons. The calculations are presented in Table 31.
TABLE 31. USN CALCULATION OF POL, MATERIAL,
AND SPARE COSTS
($ FY-90)




Deployed 4 x 658 x 656.00 1,726,592
Not deployed 8 x 330 x 656.00 1,731,840
3,458,432
per squadron
3,458,432 = 432,304 per aircraft
8 aircraft per sqdr.
432,304 = 623.00 per hour
694 hrs. yr
H. MAINTENANCE MATERIAL COSTS
9,100,000 (total expenditures) = 1,300,000 x .80
7 (squadrons on board)
= 1,040,000 per squadron
1,040,000 = 130,000 per aircraft
8 aircraft
130,000 = 187.00 per hour
694 hrs. yr
HI. REPLENISHMENT SPARES COSTS:
11,500,000 (total expenditures) = 1,642,857 x .80
7 (squadrons on board)
= 1,314,286 per squadron
1,314,286 = 164,285 per aircraft
8 aircraft
164,285 = 237.00 per hour
694 hrs. yr
Source: COMPATWINGSPAC Logistics Office
POL was figured by assuming an average squadron was deployed
four months per year. The number of training hours was 330 per month for
undeployed squadrons, and 658 per month for deployed squadrons. A cost per
hour of$656 was multiplied by the total training hours flown, and then divided
by eight aircraft per squadron to arrive at a per aircraft POL cost of $432,304.
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Dividing this total yearly aircraft POL cost by the number of flight hours flown
per year of 694 (Table 28) resulted in an average POL cost of $623 per hour.
FY-90 total costs were provided by Lcdr Wood for replenishment
spares and maintenance material. He recommended these total costs be
divided by seven (the number ofUSN squadrons onboard NAS Moffett Field),
and then multiplied by 80% to arrive at an average cost per squadron. These
costs were further broken down by dividing by the number of aircraft per
squadron, and the number of hours per aircraft, to arrive at a cost per hour as
computed in Table 31.
5. Depot Level, Engines and Component Costs
Depot level maintenance costs on engines and components were
obtained from the Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center (NADOC),
Patuxent River, Maryland, Mrs. Linda Goddard [Ref. 44]. The FY-90
T56 engine costs were broken down by NADOC into USN annual costs of
$3,618,939, and USNR annual costs of $2,214,186. The FY-90 P-3 component
costs, however, came in one total figure of$65,770,457. Here again, component
costs were allocated on the basis of number of aircraft as previously
demonstrated in Table 29. The same percentages used in Table 29 were
employed in Table 32 to derive the P-3 engine and component cost data.
The bottom line Cumulative Engine and Component Cost figures in
Table 32 were transferred to Table 28 where they were combined with depot
level costs (SDLM), and ultimately transferred to Table 1.
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TABLE 32. FY-90 T56 ENGINE AND P-3 COMPONENT COST
T56 ENGINE PRODUCTION








ALLOCATION OF T56 ENGINE USN COST




Therefore: USN T56 engine cost = $3,618,939/





3/13 = $170,322 per squadron
P-3 COMPONENT COST





Therefore: USN component cost = 34,858,342/2





24 squadrons = 1,452,431 per squadron
1/13 squadrons = 1,416,594 per squadron
CUMULATIVE ENGINE AND COMPONENT COST
USN 150,789 + 1,452,431 = 1,603,220 per squadron
USNR 170,322 + 1,416,594 = 1,586,916 per squadron
Source: NADOC Patuxent River, OP-20 Report
F. FINAL COMMENTS
Table 33 (repeat of Table 1) is once again presented for final comments
and review on page 56.
Although the data for this research study was gathered in a much more
piecemeal manner than John Schank's method (Schank used budget
justifications and estimates a great deal), it was discovered that things have
not really changed much since his 1985 study of F-4S squadrons [Ref ll:p. 4].
The P-3 Pay and Allowance ratio of 48.6% was very comparable to the 51%
formulated in his F-4S case. The Other Personnel and Base Support cost ratio
of 48.5% in this study compared favorably to the 39% in Schank's study.
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TABLE 33. NAVY P-3 ACTIVE/RESERVE SQUADRON OPERATING







Active Duty Officer 4,222,056 484,400
SELRES Enlisted 1,028,660
Active Duty Enlisted 7,742,147 3,140,640
Total 11,964,203 5,814,918 48.6%




Total 2,842,001 1,378,166 48.5%
III. REPLACEMENT ACQUISITION AND
TRAINING COSTS:
Pilot 4,568,924
Naval Flight Officer 1,551,799
Non Flight-Rated Officer 27,531 22,940
Enlisted 1,172,353 142,061
Special Active Duty Training 271,826
Total 7,320,607 436,827 6.0%
IV. EQUIPMENT OPERATING COSTS:
POL 3,458,432 1,307,736
Maintenance supplies 1,040,000 832,840
Replenishment spares 1,314,286 1,325,456
Depot maintenance 2,266,278 2,147,916
Modifications 1,073,493 1,047,006
Ordnance 1,599,208 343,726
Total equipment 10,751,697 7,004,680 65.1%
32^78,508 14,63431 44.5%;
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The Replacement Acquisition and Training Costs were 6% in this analysis
as compared to 4% in Schank's. This confirms that the reserves benefit greatly
from gains in fleet experienced personnel, as well as in tremendously reduced
training costs. Finally, as proven in Schank's case and verified by this case,
equipment operating costs are by far the most expensive cost factors (69% in
Schank's vs. 65%) in VP squadrons because of the high fixed and variable costs
in these capital intensive aviation units. The variable equipment costs are
merely a reflection of operating tempo differences between USN and USNR
forces. Overall, it appears that reserve VP squadrons operate at an attractive
44.5% of the cost of a regular fleet squadron.
Why go to the extent of conducting such a monster of an analysis and
data collection in the first place? The reasons - (1) to update the P-3 USN and
USNR cost data bases so critical today to DOD analysts and policy makers,
and (2) to use this information again in Chapter IV in an attempt to make
projections about three crucial alternative force mix changes that are currently
being proposed and debated in the P-3 community. It is hoped that this
information can be used in a constructive way to project just how much the
resultant bottom line cost ratio of 44.5% may change by taking into account
other non-recurring costs that may likely exist with force mix changes away
from the status quo. What are the non-recurring costs of a force mix change?
If the active force is reduced, do the reserves increase operating tempo or will
the tempo remain the same? If the active force is reduced, will the reserves
have to increase their replacement training costs? Will aircraft modernization
result in increased reserve costs? These are the issues that need to be projected
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and discussed in Chapter IV to give the decision maker more information to
work with, to help him or her make an educated guess as to what the real
savings are, and to determine if change is really worthwhile.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED P-3 ACTIVE/RESERVE
FORCE MIX ALTERNATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
The focus of Chapter IV will be to use the P-3 active/reserve comparative
cost analysis model derived in Chapter III (using FY-90 Operating and Support
Costs) as a basis for addressing the total cost implications of the larger force
mix changes currently being proposed by the Navy and the Department of
Defense. As part of the cost analysis performed in Chapter III, certain
assumptions were made concerning manning, replacement training, equipment
costs, and non-recurring costs. These assumptions will be restated in each of
the three proposals intended to downscale the active/reserve mix from the
current status of 24 active/13 reserve squadrons. The three force mix
alternatives that will be analyzed propose plans to reduce Maritime Patrol
force P-3 squadrons to either a level of: (1) 20 active and 13 reserve squadrons
(FY-92 mandated reduction); (2) 18 active and 9 reserve squadrons (FY-93
Navy proposal); or (3) 13 active and 13 reserve squadrons (FY-93 DOD
proposal). The analysis will encompass a derivation of total annual O&S costs
for each of the three alternatives, and a cost comparison of each against the
FY-90 cost model. The cost savings generated by each proposal will be
discounted over a five year period (FY-92 through FY-96) to yield five year net
projected savings to the Department of Defense.
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The ensuing cost analysis of the three alternatives represents an initial
and necessary quantification of comparable costs of active and reserve P-3
units operating at different force mixes. But the analyses that will be made in
this chapter would not suffice alone as a basis for adequately addressing the
total cost implications of large force mix changes as those being currently
proposed. There are additional non-recurring costs associated with instituting
large changes that must be included to provide a complete and suitable cost
analysis. These costs go beyond the scope of this thesis, but will be identified
and discussed in the next section.
B. NON-RECURRING COSTS
Non-recurring costs are basically the one-time capital outlays that result
from structure changes that inevitably occur during the activating or
deactivating of units when making force mix changes. These costs can be
significant, and should not be overlooked in any total cost analysis. If these
costs are not anticipated, policy makers could be easily deceived by the savings
or cost projections derived from cost analysis models such as the one
formulated in Chapter III. Information concerning non-recurring costs was
obtained from another study done by John Schank for the RAND Corporation
entitled Cost Analysis of Reserve Force Change - Non-Recurring Cost and
Secondary Cost Effects [Ref. 45]. In his study concerning non-recurring
costs Schank states:
These analyses, and many similar exercises performed by other
organizations, have estimated the annual operating and support costs of
individual units, treating only lightly, if at all, the net costs resulting
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from making specific changes to the existing force structure. Although the
annual cost comparisons of Active and Reserve Force units are certainly
important, the dynamic costs of a changing force must also be considered.
[Ref. 45:p. 1]
Another key point addressed by Schank is the extreme difficulty of
identifying and quantifying some of the applicable non-recurring costs [Ref.
45:p. 3]. Schank's study explores several force mix scenarios - most of which
dealt with the activation of units (probably because his studies were conducted
in an expanding force period). He does, however, indicate in a few cases the
implications of deactivating units, which are the primary concern of current
P-3 force mix proposals. The scenario of simultaneously deactivating reserve
and active units was not specifically addressed. However, the following
discussion draws inferences from his case studies involving force mix changes,
and attempts to apply them to a declining force mix scenario. The primary
non-recurring cost elements that Schank identifies are:
1. Construction of unit facilities




5. Other [Ref. 45:p. 14]
The "other" category is Schank's "catch all" where this study inserts a list
of secondary costs (force-wide costs) which Schank identifies as:
1. Equipment transfers
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2. The "Ripple Effect"
3. Mission transfer
4. Personnel pipelines
All of these secondary costs apply to the deactivation of P-3 units, but to better
suit the current declining P-3 squadron scenario, a relabeling of Schank's
primary non-recurring cost elements was undertaken. The "deactivation
version" of primary non-recurring costs can be found listed in Table 34.
TABLE 34. PRIMARY P-3 NON-RECURRING COST ELEMENTS IN
A DECLINING FORCE MIX ATMOSPHERE
1. Reprogramming use or destruction of vacant facilities
2. Divestment costs of excess unit equipment
3. Divestment costs of excess personnel
4. Divestment costs of personnel training
5. Other (secondary) costs:
A. Equipment transfers




Further inferences made based on the Schank cases explored, postulates
that non-recurring costs are generally less expensive in deactivating units than
in activating units. This is an unproven "gut feeling" and to prove this would
be a topic for follow-on study. Nonetheless, the assumption is made that in a
declining squadron environment, such as that facing the P-3 community, non-
recurring costs may be much less than costs associated with standing up
squadrons. It is therefore imperative that the force mix decision makers
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consider the potential high costs of reactivating P-3 squadrons should the
perceived reduced Soviet threat re-emerge.
1. Reprogramming Use or Destruction of Vacant Facilities
Reprogramming the use or destruction of excess capacity in such
facilities as "hangars, flight lines, maintenance buildings, administration
buildings, and personnel support facilities such as dining halls, commissaries,
and barracks" [Ref. 45:p. 14] are all costs of deactivating units. Once these one
time costs are incurred, however, there will be recurring cost savings to
support bases in the areas of operating support and maintenance of real
property.
2. Divestment of Unit Equipment
Divesting unit equipment costs would include transfer or disposal
costs of such items as: ground support equipment, maintenance support and
test equipment, spares, and munitions. This would include storage areas where
this gear is maintained. [Ref. 45:p. 17]
3. Divestment Costs of Personnel
Divesting excess personnel could entail a reduction in force (RIF), a
reprogramming of personnel into other parts of the Navy, or a combination
thereof. RIF costs could be substantial, and would include such costs as
severance pay, PCS moves, medical benefits, and the "sunk costs" of previous
training for which there is minimal "pay back." Reprogramming personnel into
other areas of the Navy may include transfer costs, PCS moves, and learning
curve or delay in new position costs.
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4. Divestment Costs of Personnel Training
Personnel costs incurred during deactivation include costs such as
transition training (if reserve personnel upgrade their equipment), retraining
of personnel who are reprogrammed into new positions, and costs created by
underutilization and excess capacity in training facilities.
5. Other - Secondary Force Wide Costs
Equipment transfer costs are included in this study since P-3 reserve
squadrons are programmed to modernize from P-3B to P-3C aircraft as a result
of deactivation of active squadrons. These transfer costs include the
modernization of support facilities at remote reserve bases which are currently
equipped to support only the P-3B. These types of costs are minimized at the
major P-3 sites such as NAS Jacksonville, Brunswick, and Moffett Field.
Additionally, there would be consideration for the costs of mothballing,
modifying or discarding the replaced reserve P-3Bs.
In addition to equipment transfers, Schank discussed the concept of
"Ripple Effect." "Ripple Effect" is basically the impact activating or
deactivating units has on other units throughout the military structure [Ref.
45:p. 8], Examples of this would include reserve aircraft modernization
requiring upgraded support facilities, and less demand for P-3 personnel
creating excess capacity in training commands. In a deactivation situation it
can be excess capacity created in hierarchial administrative units, as well as
increased demand on the few remaining squadrons if the mission does not
decrease proportionally with the decrease in squadrons.
Another possible secondary cost is mission transfer. The question of
mission transfer specific to the declining P-3 force mix remains unresolved and
could re-emerge ifthe threat or world situation changes. An interesting finding
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in this research study is that the Department of Defense apparently has no
plans to transfer missions to reserve squadrons or the remaining active
squadrons should any of the three proposals become reality. Two questions
concerning mission transfer are therefore raised: (1) "If active duty squadrons
are deactivated and the reserve squadrons are modernized with P-3C aircraft,
will the reserves pick up more of the mission and increase operating tempo?";
or (2) "Is the P-3 deactivation based entirely on a reduced perceived Soviet
threat, thereby keeping the remaining active and reserve squadrons operating
at current tempos?" Recent congressional records suggest reserve squadrons
will be modernized, and that the numbers ofTAR personnel in squadrons will
be increased so that mission transfer can be enacted. However, the proof is in
the pudding when looking at the outyear budgets. There have been no
increases in TAR personnel, or increased funds for additional flight hours
[Ref. 46]. This suggests that all force mix decisions are being made on
a cost savings and perceived reduced threat basis, vice mission transfer to
other units.
The environmental costs of deactivating military units and bases is
currently in the news as Congress assesses the costs of a long list of base
closures. The non-recurring costs of toxic clean up at military bases is proving
to be massive. These costs were totally unexpected and non-quantifiable. In a
recent article in The Monterey Herald concerning the closure of the Army's
Fort Ord, Congressman Leon Panetta stated "the Army is projecting a $400
million quickie return on the land at Fort Ord, but that's unrealistic because
cleaning up toxic contamination at the base could cost the Army that much."
The final secondary cost is the personnel pipeline issue. As indicated
in Chapter III the reserves draw most of their personnel from active duty
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squadrons who pick up the tab for initial training. If the number of active duty
squadrons are reduced disproportionately in relation to reserve squadrons, this
could dry up a portion of that "personnel pipeline" flowing to the reserves.
Thus, reserve squadrons would either have to train their own, retain personnel
for longer periods, or increase the number of TAR personnel in order to
maintain the current operating tempo. All of these options serve to
dramatically increase reserve training costs.
Non-recurring costs are very subtle, involved and hard to quantify.
This discussion merely scratches the surface of their impact. This study does
not attempt to identify or quantify all the non-recurring costs associated with
P-3 force mix changes, but it is vital to discuss and be aware of their existence.
In summary, non-recurring costs were generally excluded from this study for
the following three main reasons:
1. The probability that deactivation is less expensive than
activation under the current structure in the P-3 community.
2. The force mix change is occurring incrementally and with
advance notice (which creates better planning and anticipation).
3. Finally, as Schank states: "Annual recurring unit costs are
typically larger, especially for aviation and ship units, than the
non-recurring costs identified in the case studies. If the Reserve
Component unit change results in a decrease in annual
recurring budgets, the non-recurring investment may be
recovered in a few years." [Ref. 45 :p. viii]
66
C. FORCE MIX ALTERNATIVE I (20 ACTIVE/13 RESERVE
SQUADRONS
Before FY-91 the historical P-3 active/reserve force mix was 24 active and
13 reserve squadrons. That was the force mix which was costed in Chapter III
resulting in a reserve/active cost ratio of 44.5%.
The first alternative force mix of 20 active/13 reserve squadrons was
chosen for analysis for the simple reason that this is the mix the fleet is
scaling down to in FY-92. In fact, four active P-3 squadrons are currently
being deactivated and the force will be at 20/13 by the end of FY-91. Thus, it
seems only logical to first analyze the total cost implications and savings that
this first major force mix change realizes.
1. Assumptions
Since the Chapter III cost analysis was based on the historical 24/13
force mix, some important questions arise concerning the 20/13 mix scenario.
For example, "Do cost relationships change when the P-3 force mix changes
from that of the status quo?" "Will operating and personnel costs rise in
reserve squadrons as active squadrons are reduced?"
The answer to the first question is Yes and No. In reality, force mix
changes of any size would incur certain non-recurring costs (such as mission
transfer or ripple effect as previously stated) which would cause cost
relationships among remaining active and reserve forces to change.
Additionally, it could be argued that if fewer aircraft will be remaining in the
inventory, then the requirement for aircraft components and spare parts will
diminish and unit costs will rise. For purposes of this analysis, however, cost
relationships will not change since identification and consideration of non-
recurring costs go beyond the technical scope of this thesis. Furthermore,
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although it is likely unit costs of components and parts would rise to some
degree, optimum production rates of these items are unknown and thus it
would be impossible to figure cost differences. In any event, according to
Schank, a small force mix change in a declining environment will not change
the cost relationships dramatically [Ref. 45:p. vi].
In regards to question two, Captain Doug Birr, OP-05R, stated that
there have been no indicators to suggest increases in TAR personnel, or
increased flight hours accompanying this reduction proposal [Ref. 46].
Therefore, historical operating tempos and personnel manning levels from
Chapter III are used in the analysis of Alternative I. With the modernization
of reserve squadrons to P-3C aircraft as the four active squadrons are
deactivated, it is a certainty that reserve equipment operating costs will rise.
This factor has been incorporated into the analysis.
As a final note, it can be assumed that the remaining 20 active P-3
squadrons will be able to continue to supply sufficient replacement personnel
to the 13 reserve squadrons. Therefore, replacement training costs are held at
historical levels.
2. Analysis Procedure
First, a new summary table for Alternative I, incorporating known
cost changes was developed and displayed in Table 35. Next, a comparison of
the final cost data of Alternative I was made in relation to the status quo cost
data derived earlier in Chapter III. Projected annual cost savings were
computed. Finally, the annual cost savings projection was discounted over the
period FY-92 through FY-96 to arrive at a five year present value offuture cost
savings figure.
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TABLE 35. ALTERNATIVE I FORCE MIX: SUMMARYOF ESTIMATED






Active Duty Officer 4,222,056 484,400
SELRES Enlisted 1,028,660
Active Duty Enlisted 7,742,147 3,140,640
Total 11,967,203 5,814,918 48.6%
II. Other Personnel and Base Support Costs:
Officer 607,257 347,853
Enlisted 2,234,744 1,030,313
Total 2,842,001 1,378,166 48.5%
III. Replacement Acquisition and Training Costs:
Pilot 4,568,924
Naval Flight Officer 1,551,799
Non-flight Officer 27,531 22,940
Enlisted 1,172,353 142,061
Special Active Duty Training 271,826
Total 7,320,607 436,827 6.0%
IV. Equipment Operating Costs:
POL 3,458,432 2,207,912
Maintenance Supplies 1,040,000 662,728
Replenishment Spares 1,314,286 839,928
Depot Maintenance 2,266,278 2,147,916
Modifications 1,073,493 1,073,493
Ordnance 1,599,208 343,726
Total Equipment 10,751,697 7,275,703 67.7%
* , ................. Total Unit Costs 32,878,508 ujm#u 45.3
In Table 35, Equipment Operating Costs per squadron are the only
costs that changed based upon the P-3C aircraft modernization of reserve
squadrons. This was accomplished by applying all USN P-3C costs from Table
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28 to the USNR column (except for reserve flying hours per aircraft and
training ordnance). Appropriate changes to Table 28 are shown in Table 36.




Flying hours/aircraft/year 694 443
Cost/squadron/year for:
Training Ordnance 1,599,208 343,726
Modifications 1,073,493 1,073,493
Depot, SDLM 663,058 663,058
Depot, Engines and Components 1,603,220 1,603,220
Costs/flying hour for:
POL 623 623
Maintenance Material 187 187
Replenishment Spares 237 237
A final examination ofTable 35 (excluding the non-recurring costs of
deactivation) shows a slightly higher reserve/active cost ratio of 45.3% when
compared to the status quo cost ratio of 44.5%. The major cost savings is being
realized from the operation of four less active duty squadrons. Alternative I
annual cost savings are calculated in Table 37.
TABLE 37. ALTERNATIVE I PROJECTED ANNUAL COST SAVINGS
($ FY-90)
Status Quo: 24/13 mix
USN
USNR















Alternative I: 20/13 mix
USN
USNR












NOTE: Annual costs per squadron were obtained from Table 1 for the 24113 mix, and Table 35 for the 20 1 13 mix.
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As shown, an alternative force mix of20/13 would save approximately
$128 million per year in FY-90 dollars. Projecting these cost savings for the
period FY-92 through FY-96 (using a discounting factor of 4%) resulted in a
five year present value of future cost savings of $547,876,926 (Table 38).
TABLE 38. COST SAVINGS OF ALTERNATIVE I DISCOUNTED
AT 4% (FY-92 TO FY-96)
($ FY-90)
FY-92 FY-93 FY-94 FY-95 FY-96
Discounted Savings (4%) 118,334,627 113,783,296 109,407,015 105,199,053 101,152,935
Total 5 Year Savings $547,876,926
Table 38 shows a five year discounted cost savings projection in
excess of one half billion dollars. This substantial cost savings would rapidly
recover any non-recurring costs generated by the four squadron reduction,
assuming operational tempos, manning, and maintenance units costs would
remain the same [Ref. 45:p. viii].
D. FORCE MIX ALTERNATIVE II (18 ACTIVE/9 RESERVE
SQUADRONS)
In the analysis of the FY-93 Department of the Navy force mix proposal
of 18 active and 9 reserve squadrons, Captain Doug Birr, OP-05R, was again
consulted concerning the status offlight hour or manning level increases which
may accompany a deactivation of this level. His response remained consistent
in that the Navy anticipated no flight hour increases or additional TAR billets
programmed into these reductions. Therefore, the same assumptions that were
made for Alternative I were applied to Alternative II (incorporating only
increased costs for reserve modernization to the P-3C aircraft). The same
slightly higher cost ratio of45.3% found in Table 35 ofAlternative I was again
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used to find a new cost savings projection between the status quo mix of 24/13
and the Alternative II mix of 18/9 in Table 39.
TABLE 39. ALTERNATIVE II: PROJECTED ANNUAL
COSTS SAVINGS
($ FY-90)
Status Quo: 24/13 mix # Squadrons Annual Cost Total Cost
Per Squadron
Total USN + USNR (Annual cost previously found in Table 37) 979,333,875
Alternative II: 18/9 mix
USN 18 x 32,878,508 = 591,813,144
USNR 9 x 14,905,614 = 134,150,526
Total USN and USNR Costs 725,963,670
Therefore: Annual Cost Savings (979,333,875 - 725,963,670) = $253,370,205
Note: Annual costs per squadrons from Table 35.
Table 39 yields an annual cost savings projection of approximately $253
million per year in FY-90 dollars. Projecting these cost savings for the period
FY-92 through FY-96 (using a discounting factor of 4%) resulted in a five year
present value of future cost savings of $968,655,723 (Table 40) for Alternative
II. Alternative I savings were used for FY-92 since Alternative II savings will
not be realized until FY-93.
TABLE 40. COST SAVINGS OF ALTERNATIVE II DISCOUNTED
AT 4% (FY-92 TO FY-96)
($ FY-90)
FY-92 FY-93 FY-94 FY-95 FY-96
Discounted Savings (4%) 118,334,627* 225,245,190 216,581,913 208,251,870 200,242,153
Total 5 Year Savings $968,655,723
* Alternative I cost savings used for FY-92 since Alternative II savings do not apply until FY-93.
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Table 40 shows that the stair stepped decline to a force mix of 18 active
and 9 reserve squadrons is estimated to save nearly $1 billion in O&S costs
during the five year period FY-92 through FY-96 (FY-90 dollars).
E. FORCE MIX ALTERNATIVE III (13 ACTIVE/13 RESERVE
SQUADRONS)
The third and final analysis of proposed force mix alternatives was
initiated by the Department ofDefense for FY-93. DOD has proposed an active
P-3 force reduction of 11 squadrons for a mix of 13 active and 13 reserve
squadrons. This dramatic decrease in active P-3 squadrons would have a
significant impact on the "personnel pipeline," which as previously stated, is
the current primary source of manning for reserve squadrons. If this proposal
were enacted, the reserves would more than likely need to initiate policy or
structural changes in order to maintain current operating tempos. The
following options have been suggested as possible reserve solutions to counter
a reduced pipeline:
1. Increase TAR manning [Ref. 47]
2. Reserves train their own program
3. Increased SELRES contractual obligations
4. Increase SELRES overgrade waivers
Option 1, to increase TAR manning levels, was utilized in this analysis
because it was the option proposed by OP-05R [Ref. 47]. It also required the
least in the way of reserve policy changes. OP-05R generated estimates ofTAR
manning increases in an effort to anticipate the reserve manning deficiencies
resulting from the disproportionate reduction in active P-3 squadrons should
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Alternative III be enacted. Option 2 (reserves train their own) would be
possible, but this method would attempt to develop reserve Officers who have
never had "fleet experience." Options 3 and 4 would require changing
fundamental reserve policies and reenlistment contracts which would affect all
reserves, and not just P-3 squadron personnel. A new summary table (Table
42) has been generated to incorporate reserve TAR manning increases and P-
3C modernization.
According to the OP-05R estimates, a force mix of 13 active and 13
reserve squadrons would require an approximate 44% TAR manning level as
opposed to a historical 31% TAR manning level [Ref. 47]. The OP-05R TAR
manning estimates for a 13 active and 13 reserve squadron mix can be found
in Table 41.
TABLE 41. OP-05R TAR MANNING ESTIMATES
TAR SELRES TOTAL %
I. Historical 24 Active/13 Reserve Force Mix
Officer 7 68 75 31%
Enlisted 105 186 291 TAR manning
II. 13 Active/13 Reserve Force Mix
Officer 21 54 75 44%
Enlisted 141 150 291 TAR manning
Source: OP-05R
NOTE: These are merely estimates by OP-5R and are not official or incorporated into any future planning
The USNR per capita pay figures generated in Chapter III, Table 2, are
multiplied by the increased TAR manning levels in Table 41 to arrive at the
new USNR personnel costs in Table 42.
In a force mix change as large as Alternative III, the non-recurring costs
become more widespread, harder to identify, and harder to quantify [Ref. 45 :p.
vi]. For example, the unit costs for SDLM aircraft and components may rise;
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TABLE 42. ALTERNATIVE III FORCE MIX: SUMMARY OF






Active Duty Officer 4,222,056 1,453,200
SELRES Enlisted 741,750
Active Duty Enlisted 7,742,147 4,217,451
Total 11,964,203 7,259,769 60.1%




Total 2,842,001 1,378,166 48.5%
III. REPLACEMENT ACQUISITION AND
TRAINING COSTS:
Pilot 4,568,924
Naval Flight Officer 1,551,799
Non Flight-Rated Officer 27,531 22,940
Enlisted 1,172,353 142,061
Special Active Duty Training 271,826
Total 7,320,607 436,827 6.0%
IV. EQUIPMENT OPERATING COSTS:
POL 3,458,432 2,207,912
Maintenance supplies 1,040,000 662,728
Replenishment spares 1,314,286 839,928





the cost to train a pilot may rise dramatically; and the marginal cost of per
capita base operating and support cost may rise with a reduction of 11 active
squadrons. Again, these changes are hard to predict and were not incorporated
into this analysis. Therefore, the alternative with the most likely error in total
costs would be Alternative III. The 49.7% reserve/active cost ratio (Table 42)
could easily exceed 50 or 60% with non-recurring deactivation costs included.
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In any case, the projected annual cost savings ofAlternative III were developed
in Table 43.
TABLE 43. ALTERNATIVE III: PROJECTED ANNUAL
COST SAVINGS
($ FY-90)
Status Quo: 24/13 Mix # Squadrons Annual Cost Total Cost
Per Squadron
Total USN + USNR (annual cost previously found in Table 37) 979,333,875
Alternative III: 13/13 Mix
USN 13 x 32,878,506 = 427,420,578
USNR 13 x 16,350,465 = 212,556,045
Total USN + USNR Costs 639,976,623
Therefore: Annual Cost Savings (979,333,875 - 639,976,623) = $339,357,252
NOTE: Annual costs per squadron figures obtained from Table 42.
An estimated $340 million per year would be saved (FY-90 dollars) if
Alternative III were enacted. Once again, this savings estimate was discounted
and summed over the same five year period (FY-92 through FY-96) in Table
44.
TABLE 44. COST SAVINGS OF ALTERNATIVE HI DISCOUNTED
AT 4% (FY-92 TO FY-96)
($ FY-90)
FY-92 FY-93 FY-94 FY-95 FY-96
Discounted Savings (4%) 118,334,627* 301,687,361 290,084,001 278,926,924 268,198,966
Total 5 Year Savings $1,257,231,879
* Alternative I cost savings used for FY-92 since Alternative III savings do not apply until FY-93.
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Alternative III projects a five year discounted savings of nearly $1.25
billion if the Department of Defense elects to downscale to a mix of 13 active
and 13 reserve squadrons.
Finally, Table 45 displays a summary of the five year discounted cost
savings projection of all three alternative force mix proposals. The savings that
the Department of Defense can obtain by implementing any of the three force
mix alternatives ranges from a low of $.5 billion to a high of $1.25 billion.
These numbers are realistic and could represent the first installment savings
on a five year plan that the Department of Defense feels is consistent with the
reduced threat to national security. Decision makers need to be reminded,
however, that some of the cost savings from squadron deactivation could be
expended by earlier defined one-time non-recurring closure costs, and those
costs that might be incurred in meeting additional training requirements of
remaining squadrons whose missions could ultimately be realigned or
consolidated to assure overall VP readiness capability is maintained.
[Ref. 48:p. 38]. In any event, these cost savings projections and cost
ratios are the impetus for the summary statements, conclusions and
recommendations to follow in Chapter V.
TABLE 45. ALTERNATIVE I, II, AND III COST SAVINGS
PROJECTION SUMMARY
($ FY-90)
5 Year Cost Cost Ratio
Savings Reserve/Active
Alternative I - 20 Active/13 Reserve $547,876,926 45.3
Alternative II - 18 Active/13 Reserve $968,655,723 45.3
Alternative III - 13 Active/13 Reserve $1,257,231,879 49.7
Note: Five year projections discounted at 4%
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Probably the most widely discussed total force issue of the past year has
been the active/reserve force mix decision process - the methodology used and
factors considered in assigning forces and missions to the active and reserve
components. Triggered by a rising defense budget and the changing
circumstances in the world (the threat change), the active/reserve Maritime
Patrol (VP) force mix issue, in particular, has been a subject of much debate
during recent Congressional hearings.
In light of the growing public concern over increased defense spending
and Congressional directives stressing the need to reduce costs through more
efficient use of available reserve forces, Chapter I stated that the focus of this
thesis was to identify and analyze the cost differences between an active duty
VP squadron and a similar reserve squadron. The idea of performing a cost
analysis comparing annual operating and support costs of active and reserve
VP squadrons with similar manning, equipment and wartime missions was
timely and appropriate in view of recent mandates to downscale the VP
community.
Chapter II provided a brief introduction to the Reserve force structure
with emphasis on defining the key personnel terms and Reserve participation
requirements. The concept ofReserve force integration was introduced, and the
prospect that continued integration and modernization of the VP Reserves
could yield significant peacetime dividends for the Navy was discussed.
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Chapter III laid the groundwork for the costing approach. Cost
definitions, details and assumptions of the analysis were reviewed and a
framework for assessing the personnel, equipment and support costs of each
organization was developed.
The latest FY-90 VP cost data obtained from official published service
documents and professional organizations visited during research trips was
then applied to the generated cost model. The results of the costing
methodology, and general observations of the factors that drive the annual
costs ofVP active and reserve force units and resulting cost differentials were
discussed.
Finally, Chapter IV investigated the cost savings related to recently
proposed active/reserve force mix alternatives, and the associated non-
recurring costs of instituting a large force mix change were explained.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Although active and reserve P-3 squadrons have nearly the same types
and amounts of equipment and personnel, the results of this study indicate
that substantial cost savings are present within the reserve P-3 side. The final
cost comparison clearly shows that the P-3 Reserve squadron had annual
operating and support costs of 44.5 percent of the cost of the active squadron
with an annual total cost savings of approximately $18.25 million for FY-90
(Table 33).
General observations of the study show that the P-3 Reserve forces
typically realize cost advantages over the active forces in the areas ofpersonnel
costs, replacement training costs, base operating support costs, and reduced
equipment operating requirements in a peacetime environment. Figure 1 shows
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the comparable costs of an active P-3 squadron and a reserve P-3 squadron.
The costs are broken into the four main categories as described in Chapter III.
The ratio of reserve P-3 costs to active P-3 costs for each category and for the
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Figure 1. Cost Comparison of P-3 Active and Reserve Squadrons
($ Millions FY-90)
The larger-than-expected reserve personnel cost ratio of 48.6 percent
contradicts the conventional notion that a reserve unit's personnel should cost
approximately 20 percent ofa comparable active unit's personnel [Ref. 6:p. vii].
The higher reserve personnel costs can be explained by the large number of
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full-time members (TARs) who must perform the continuous equipment
maintenance and unit support functions that are required to operate the
squadrons. Also, the reduced availability of full-time reserve crews to operate
aircraft in peacetime limits the operating tempo of reserve squadrons and
reduces those variable costs related to flying hours.
The replacement training costs for the reserve P-3 squadron are a
microscopic six percent of the cost for the active squadron because of the
combination of higher retention rates and prior-service gains of the reserves.
In Naval aviation, the high costs of training aircrew members has made the
recruiting of prior-service individuals a very cost effective reserve strategy.
Figure 2 compares the five year projected cost savings as a result of
transferring modern P-3C's to reserve squadrons and deactivating active
squadrons based on current and proposed P-3 force mixes. The range of savings
from $.5 billion to $1.25 billion over five years (discounted for inflation) is
slightly less optimistic than Senator Sam Nunn's earlier savings estimates of
between $1.5 and $1.8 billion.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. For Navy Policy
a. Developing the tools and models that would aid analysis in
providing the cost details needed in making VP force mix policy decisions (as
this thesis has done) is important. However, cost should not be considered the
driving factor in determining the assignment of missions between the active
and reserve VP forces - supporting national security objectives should be.
Responsible officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force
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Figure 2. Projected Cost Savings for Each of the Proposed VP
Force Mix Alternatives
mission accomplishment and not budget constraints as the deciding factor in
determining the number ofVP squadrons to be downsized or eliminated from
the force structure.
b. The 46 percent reduction in the size of the active VP forces as
proposed by the Department of Defense would seriously preclude full P-3
coverage of forward deployed sites. New generations of substantially quieter
and more capable submarines in the Soviet Union and navies of other
countries requires sufficient numbers ofP-3s to counter the threat. Despite the
"perceived" reduced threat, a need exists to preserve VP skills and equipment,
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so that we do not reach a point where the changes we make are irreversible.
"Historically, this country has disarmed after every war, and it is entirely
possible that we will repeat the mistakes of the past and disarm after the Cold
War so thoroughly that we will create the foundation for the instability that
may lead to the next war [Ref. 49]." As an alternative, DOD needs to
explore innovative new strategies to reduce costs, such as a policy of "flexible
readiness" or increased use of flight simulators to enhance proficiency training
without employing expensive field training.
c. Any future VP squadron cutbacks should be done at a slow
process over a minimum of a five year period. A more rapid modernization of
VP reserve squadrons would not be achievable and desirable because: (1)
existing reserve training facilities cannot support a rapid transition rate; (2)
integrated logistic support requires a minimum of 2-3 years lead time to
upgrade reserve air stations to P-3C intermediate maintenance capability; and
(3) rapid downsizing might negatively affect the careers, benefits and vitality
of those individuals tied to the success of the VP organization.
d. Given the magnitude ofthe Navy's and DOD's proposed VP cuts,
the pool ofpotential prior-service inductees into the reserves will be drastically
drawn down. This would result in an increase in full-time TAR personnel to
augment reserve squadrons, which equates to higher training costs and base
operating support costs. As a partial solution, DOD can encourage individuals
to fill critical SELRES positions by revising current reenlistment contracts for
the active forces. For example, a two-year ready reserve obligation (to be
served as a SELRES) could become a standard clause in reenlistment
contracts.
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2. For Future Research
a. The cost model presented in this thesis ignores certain elements
of cost associated with the possible activation or deactivation ofVP squadrons
as part of large force mix changes. Future research in the areas of (1) costs
associated with construction of new facilities or disposal of existing facilities;
(2) increased recruiting and training costs to support a new squadron; and (3)
active squadron shutdown costs, such as the transportation of personnel and
equipment and the deactivation (mothballing) of equipment - will provide the
complete cost analysis needed for "best mix" policy decisions.
b. With the reduced Soviet threat and longer warning times, an
alternative to the maintenance of large VP active/reserve forces might be the
implementation of a "flexible readiness" system. Future research should
explore the feasibility ofkeeping forward deployed active forces at a high state
of readiness, but sustaining reserve squadrons at a lower adjusted readiness
level.
c. Researchers should look into the cost effectiveness of launching
a major program to invest in P-3 flight and weapon system trainers (WSTs) to
permit enhanced proficiency training without employing expensive field
training (reduced operational tempos). Particular emphasis should be placed
on training systems that can help alleviate the unique training problems faced
by P-3 reserve component units. "Steps to assure the portability of training
software and interoperability of training simulators will reduce costs further,
despite relatively high initial investment costs [Ref. 48:p. 38]."
d. For the latest detailed information useful for estimating the
various elements of cost asssociated with changes to the Active and Reserve
force structure, refer to John Schank's newest reference handbook entitled Cost
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Element Handbook for Estimating Active and Reserve Costs [Ref. 50]. This
reference book provides the cost analyst with an invaluable section on how and
where to obtain Navy cost data, and the Navy offices to contact to obtain
further information.
The cost analysis described in this thesis has represented a more
thorough and up-to-date quantification of the comparable costs of active and
reserve P-3 squadrons. The resulting cost estimates have been based on the
current P-3 force structure, and may be used for small changes in the current
force mix. However, it will not totally suffice as a basis for adequately
addressing the cost implications of large force mix decisions such as those
presented in Figure 2. Nevertheless, the inherently lower costs of part-time
personnel and lower operating tempo of P-3 reserve squadrons ensure that




ACDUTRA Active Duty for Training, also termed Annual
Active Duty
ACTIVE Military Personnel who are employed full-time by
the United States Armed Forces
ADDITIONAL DRILLS Additional drills beyond required drills used in
order to increase the operating tempo of a reserve
unit
DRILL One four-hour period of reserve training; 48
required drills per year
FLIGHT-RATED Personnel who qualify for aviation incentive pay
FRS Fleet Replacement Squadrons which train newly
winged pilots in specific aircraft type to replenish
to fleet squadrons
IRR Individual Ready Reserve - Reservists who have a
military obligation but are not in a drill pay
status
NFO Naval Flight Officer, a flight-rated Officer who
operates flight and weapon systems in Naval
aircraft
NON FLIGHT-RATED Personnel who are not in a flying status
O&S Annual recurring operating and support costs
PAA Primary Authorized Aircraft
RIF Reduction in Force
SELRES Selected Reservist - a member of the Ready
Reserve in a drill pay state; works only part-time -
for the Armed Forces
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SPECIAL ACDUTRA ACDUTRA performed in excess of annual
(SPECACDUTRA) ACDUTRA.; usually granted to provide additional
training
STANDBY RESERVE Personnel who are not required to perform drills
but desire to maintain their military affiliation
and have skills which will be required at
mobilization, or Reservists who have been
designated as key federal employees
TAR Active Reserve personnel assigned to administer
the Reserve program
USN United States Navy; regular Naval forces
USNR United States Naval Reserve; Naval reserve forces
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